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Abstract 
The idea of the research project is to examine the possible correlation between 
economic interdependence and security. The following thesis will look at the members of 
Commonwealth of Independent States in a dyad with Russia over the last decade in order to 
determine the variables, that accordance with the independent variable, i.e. economic 
interdependence can affect security in the mentioned dyads. Already from the 1950s, liberals 
in international relations along with liberals in economics have described the benefits of trade 
and economic interdependence, making it too costly to engage in a conflict. Globalization 
theorists have evolved the concept and economists tend to say that the world is (at least in 
financial terms) very much interdependent. This all should make conflict a very costly option 
for a state and enforce pacifism between states and in the international arena in general. But 
economic interdependence can also be of asymmetric nature, making the costs of a conflict 
very high to one counterpart and thus reducing the threat of a conflict to the second 
counterpart. The thesis will look at how economic interdependence along with other relevant 
variables can affect conflict or perhaps prevent it from happening in the first place. A theory 
is presented and it is tested through corroborative examples of military disputes between 
Russia and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
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Introduction 
 The Ukrainian conflict, that started with the Euromaidan protests back in November 
of 2013, against the decision of declining the Ukrainian European-Union Associations 
Agreement. The decision to decline the agreement and align Ukraine’s foreign- and economic 
policy away from the European Union and towards Russia was made by the now former 
president Viktor Yanukovych and his government in Vilnius, during the European Union 
summit. The decision of declining the Associations Agreement sparked a spontaneous non-
political gathering of Kiev’s younger generation that quickly escalated with violence and 
evolved into a confrontation between the sitting president Yanukovych and the protesters 
who demanded Yanukovych’s resignation and a whole new policy towards the European 
Union. The protests that started on the night of 21 November 2013 were a surprise to the 
ruling regime and the president hoped to dissolve the protests and continue its path to further 
integrate Ukraine with Russia.  
Irregardless of Yanukovych’s attempts to dissolve the protests, they failed and had a 
contrary effect – the more the ruling regime tried to break the opposition on Euromaidan, the 
stronger it grew and the more it demanded from the ruling regime to step down. Even more, 
since the protests got more and more attention from foreign media and from the European 
Union who all supported publicly the protesters, the support for the protesters and a new 
potential government also increased within the public of Ukraine and sparked pro-European 
protests throughout Ukraine.  
Yet at the same time, pro-Russian and pro-regime protests started in Eastern-Ukraine 
that had a strong economic, political, historical and perhaps most importantly – a strong 
identity connection with Russia. After the Agreement on Settlement of Political Crisis in 
Ukraine was signed between Yanukovych’s regime and the opposition, Yanukovych fled the 
next day to Russia and Russia started backing the pro-Russian protests in the regions of 
Donetsk and Luhansk. The dominant population in Eastern-Ukraine was poorly assimilated 
with the Western-Ukraine and did not share the same values and beliefs as the Western-
Ukraine, the two Ukraine’s did not have a unifying single identity.  
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After Yanukovych fled to Russia and Russia started actively backing the pro-Russian 
movements in Donbass, a civil war broke loose and Russia had lost one of its strongest allies 
in Eastern Europe besides Belarus. Yet Ukraine was both politically and economically 
heavily integrated with the Russian economy through trade, FDI and strategic energy carriers 
(in our case natural gas) and through the liberal discourse of economic interdependence and 
peace and through the realist discourse of asymmetric economic dependence,1 Russia should 
have increased its influence and power over Ukraine and making it eventually dependent on 
its own economy. This should have eventually increased security for both Russia and Ukraine 
since the higher the level of interdependency. In theory, the higher the level of 
interdependency, the lower the potential gains of war and the higher the potential losses of 
war. In the current case, this model especially applies for Ukraine, since Ukraine was the 
economically smaller, more dependent partner of Russia and was also weaker in terms of 
military power. It seems like the liberal theory of complex interdependence and peace failed 
in Ukraine and the realist perspective of an anarchic international system prevailed.  
The current research tries to look at the conflicts of Ukraine and Georgia through the 
model of complex interdependence and answer the question, if interdependence did fail and 
could not have prevented the crises of Ukraine and Georgia. The scope of the research is 
wide, since the question of interdependence and peace has been advocated by liberals for 
decades and several quantitative researches confirm the hypothesis that interdependence 
fosters peace between its members. Realists on the other hand have been implying that 
increased levels of interdependence not reduce, but increase the likelihood of militarized 
interstate disputes between its parties. The idea is to map the existing theoretical framework 
of liberalism and realism by analyzing studies conducted within the discourse of international 
relations and international political economy. After a comprehensive analytical overview 
about the arguments of both liberalism and realism, the study tries to find out the reasons 
behind the Ukrainian and Georgian conflict. This is done by using the model of complex 
interdependency. The complex interdependence model was chosen, since it incorporates 
                                                 
1 Steven C. Denney, Brian D. Gleason, Yonsei University, 2012. „The Political Economy of Trade 
Policy: A Realist Perspective” available at: https://sinonk.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/the-political-economy-
of-trade-policy-steven_c_denney-brian_d_gleason.pdf%20Accessed%207/1/12 (accessed 04.05.2016). 
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different inputs of societal variables like political economy, international 
(trans)governmental organizations and business corporations, but also emphasizes the 
importance of formal and informal communication on different levels between the states in 
a dyadic relationship. The theory describes the complex relations of states on an international 
arena and tries to explain that states can no longer be seen as entities that act and evolve on 
their own. A state is not a ding an sich, it is a political and legal entity created by men and 
run by men. For the latter reason the current research also pays attention to the factor of 
public opinion and the valid national values and morals of a society. The discourse of 
international political economy is strongly related with complex interdependence and more 
so, with economic interdependence. Economic interdependence has evolved into a big part 
of complex interdependence and is considered in IPE as important as complex 
interdependency itself. The values and measures of economic interdependence will be the 
markers in this research for determining whether the existence of complex interdependence 
will be studied or not. For the latter reason, economic dependence is measured by methods 
evolved in the field of IPE.  
 The study’s structure is to determine the amount of economic interdependence 
between Russia and its eight CIS partner in a dyadic relationship. This means economic 
interdependence is measured and the results presented for eight different dyads plus the two 
dyads of Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Georgia. After determining the scope of economic 
interdependence within the dyads, the focus will be turned towards Ukraine and Georgia in 
order to find answers about the origins of conflict in the framework of complex 
interdependence theory. This is done to determine whether the liberal or realist theory about 
interdependence and peace prevails and if the liberal assumption of interdependence and 
peace can be blamed in the case of Ukraine and Georgia. When economic interdependence 
prevails in other dyads as well, they will be also studied within the model of complex 
interdependence and compared with the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. 
 The research starts by giving an analytical overview about the aspects of complex 
interdependence theory, the liberal and realist arguments, presents the theoretical framework 
of the current research and presents the variables used to measure complex interdependence. 
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After the findings of economic interdependence are presented, the Russia-Ukraine and 
Russia-Georgia dyad will be analyzed within the complex interdependency framework and 
compared with any other dyad which showed the existence of economic interdependence 
with Russia. 
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Theoretical base 
The two predominant discourses in the field of international relations about the 
potential correlation of economic interdependence and peace/war are derived from the 
ongoing realism and liberalism debate. The following chapter will look more in-depth first 
of all the theory of complex interdependence that will offer the theoretical base for the 
empirical analysis in the current research. The two competing international relations theories 
presented after Keohane & Nye’s theory serves the purpose to give an overview how the two 
big schools in international relations interpret interdependence and how a different end result 
can be possible by interpreting the facts and figures from a different perspective. and brings 
forth the main concepts and ideas behind the two schools of thought.  
Theory of Complex Interdependence 
Keohane & Nye’s theory of complex interdependence has three main dimensions2: 
1. Multiple Channels connect societies, including informal ties between government 
elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental 
elites (face-to-face and through telecommunications); and transnational organizations (such 
as multinational banks or corporations). These channels can be summarized as interstate, 
transgovernmental, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels 
assumed by realists. Transgovernmental applies when we relax the realist assumption that 
the states act coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption that 
states are only units. 
2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not 
arranged in a clear consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, 
among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. Many 
issues arise what used to be considered domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic 
and foreign issues becomes blurred. These issues are considered in several government 
departments (not just foreign offices), and at several levels. Inadequate policy coordination 
on these issues involves significant costs. Different issues generate different coalitions, both 
                                                 
2 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, 2011. Power and Interdependence. Pearson. 
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within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does 
not stop at waters’ edge. 
3. Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the 
region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be 
important in these governments’ relations with governments outside the region, or on other 
issues. Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on 
economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important that 
alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc. For the former relationship this 
condition of complex interdependence would be met, for the latter, it would not.  
Keohane & Nye also explained the term ‘dependence’: “Dependence means a state 
of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most 
simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to 
situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries.”3 The latter concept was further developed in 1996 by Marc A. Genest: “An 
economic transnationalist concept that assumes that states are not the only important actors, 
social welfare issues share center stage with security issues on the global agenda, and 
cooperation is as dominant a characteristic of international politics as conflict.”4 
It is also vital to point out, that the “reciprocal effects of interdependence always 
involve both costs and benefits, since interdependence restricts autonomy and benefits from 
interdependence are not always guaranteed. Therefore interdependence between states will 
directly or indirectly constrain state behavior in that states have to maximize the benefits and 
minimize the costs of interdependence by choosing between military balancing and 
institutional balancing,” as described by Kai He who analyzed the concept of 
interdependence by Keohane and Nye.5 Military balancing is seen by Keohane and Nye, just 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Marc A. Genest, 1996. Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations. 
Thomson&Wadsworth.  
5 Kai He, „Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and 
Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,“ European Journal of International Relations, 2008, (14), pp. 
489-518 
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like by all the economic liberals, not a viable option, since the negative effects associated 
with a less friendly strategy would only deepen due to the high levels if interdependence. 
Instead institutional balancing becomes a potential option of dealing with the rival when in a 
highly interdependent relationship.6 The described situation also applies when talking about 
a high level of economic interdependence. In such a relation, the states are more likely to opt 
for a different, in this case for institutional balancing, instead opting for military balancing.  
So what Keohane and Nye along with Genest are implying, is that in a complex 
interdependence relationship, states tend to avoid military conflicts and disputes and rather 
see cooperation as the key of success. Cooperation and competition between different 
economic sectors for instance would it make it too costly for the states to interact in a war. 
Especially when talking about economic gains, war is a very costly and risky option. Since 
war itself demands a lot of resources and in severe cases paralyzing the industrial sector and 
making it a part of the military industry. This in return puts the economy in general onto a 
hold and the impelling sectors of a state economy cannot function as in a state of zero conflict. 
This creates a financial situation, where the state who is engaged in a military dispute is 
losing money – as an ongoing war itself is not a profitable economic action and as historic 
evidence shows in the case of Russia for instance, that a military conflict can end up very 
costly for the stronger party in a dyad (i.e. Soviet-Afghan War, Russo-Georgian War). This 
applies to both parties of the interdependent dyad, but especially for the smaller party, since 
the dependence of trade and inward capital flows are higher and breaking those ties is 
economically much more costly for the smaller party in a dyad than it is for the stronger 
party. 
The given example can also be explained by the concepts of sensibility and 
vulnerability, created by Keohane and Nye as a part of interdependence. Sensitivity, 
“involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in 
one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects.” 
Vulnerability can be described as, “the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives 
that various actors face.” In more distilled terms, sensitivity is used to describe the pressures 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
  
13 
 
faced by various State actors as the result of others’ actions, while vulnerability is how open 
their options are to changing the processes and framework of their own structure to suit their 
needs.7 
Liberalism 
The two theoretical schools of thought have argued from the 18th century, when 
Immanuel Kant published his essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” whether 
economic interdependence and greater economic integration fosters peace between states and 
potentially hinders the rise of conflicts between economically interdependent trading 
partners. Susan M. McMillan studied the works of Immanuel Kant and Richard Cobden in 
order to determine their impact on modern economic liberalism in the context of economic 
interdependence: “For [Richard] Cobden free trade was expected to help end warfare in two 
ways. First free trade would help by “undermining the income and position of the ruling 
landlord class” such that the aristocrats would not be able to raise an army and fight 
effectively. Second, free trade was expected to help by bringing nations into a relationship 
of economic dependence in which they would recognize that their own wealth and prosperity 
depended on others. Because disruption of commercialities by war would be against a 
country’s interest, dependence would lead to a reduction of conflict”8 McMillan continues 
by analyzing the works of Norman Angell: “Economic interdependence creates a situation in 
which the use of military means will not improve a concqueror’s wealths. Because the 
“financial and industrial security of the victor is dependent upon financial and industrial 
security in all considerable civilized centers.” 9 For Angell the only viable option was to leave 
the wealth and territory in the possession of its occupants. The latter ideas also formed 
Angell’s main hypothesis, “that increasing territory is no longer the way to increase wealth, 
                                                 
7 The Meridian Journal, 2014. “Disparities in Sensitivity and Vulnerability in the Liberal System” 
available at: https://lcmeridianjournal.com/2014/11/16/disparities-in-sensitivity-and-vulnerability-in-the-
liberal-system/ (accessed: 03.05.2016). 
8 Susan M. McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,” Mershshon International Studies Review, 1997, 
(41), pp. 33-58. 
9 Ibid.  
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given that political administrations change but victory does not ensure a transfer of property 
from one owner to another.”10 
Gartzke and Lupu also elaborated the on the concept of interdependence and conflict 
by reexamining the works of late 19th century and 20th century scholars like Richard Cobden, 
Norman Angell and Richard R. Rosecrance in the context of World War I. Gartzke and Lupu 
argued that although WWI did occur, economic interdependence and interdependence in 
general did manage to prevent some crises before the war between interdependent nations, 
but “economic integration was incapable of forestalling conflict where integration had yet to 
occur.” Gartzke and Lupu continue: “interdependence, primarily in the form of interstate 
trade, raises the opportunity costs of war, thus making contests less likely. The logic of these 
arguments is that a war between trading partners would likely disrupt that trade, forcing states 
to seek other markets. This would require a shift to different, less lucrative, trade partners.”11 
They continue their analysis by expounding the liberal economic interdependence concepts 
of Arthur A. Stein and again Richard R. Rosecrance and summarize: “As trade increases, 
states can achieve gains more efficiently through economic means than through warfare. In 
other words, when states can grow their economies through international commerce, there is 
a decreased incentive to attempt to do so through territorial conflict. Open financial and goods 
markets may also create similar disincentives for states to fight.”12  
Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins researched the subject of economic 
interdependence and war in their book “Economic Interdependence and International 
Conflict New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate”. The authors, like Gartzke and Lupu, 
look at liberal theorists like Eugene Staley and Richard R. Rosecrance, their concepts about 
economic interdependence and peace and conclude: “Economic exchange and military 
conquest are substitute means of acquiring the resources needed to promote political security 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Erik Gartzke, Yonatan Lupu, „Trading on Preconceptions. Why World War I Was Not a Failure of 
Economic Interdependence,“ International Security, 2012, (36), pp. 115-150 
12 Ibid. 
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and economic growth. As trade and foreign investment increase, there are fewer incentives 
to meet these needs through territorial expansion, imperialism, and foreign conquest.”13 
Erik Gartzke, Quan Li and Charles Boehmer make an argument, that along with trade, 
interstate monetary policy cooperation and capital flows reduce the likelihood of conflict by 
allowing states in crisis situations to send costly signals without needing to resort to violence 
or crisis escalation that may precipitate violence.14 Gartzke, on his own, continued to develop 
the concept and argued that “interdependence, defined as including trade, development, open 
financial markets, and monetary policy coordination, reduces conflict by (1) aligning state’s 
interests, which gives them less to fight over; (2) providing a means of peacefully securing 
resources; and (3) allowing states to foresee the costs of fighting, which facilitates bargaining 
and compromise.”15 Again it is clear how interdependence, and in the present case, economic 
interdependence can act as a tool for avoiding conflicts. The latter three options and 
possibilities for states to avoid conflict can be seen as arising from interdependence, 
especially economic interdependence, but the proposed options can also be linked and occur 
within an supra-national institution. This is what Keohane and Nye described as institutional 
balancing through multilateral institutions. The concept of institutional balancing is derived 
from interdependence itself and also withholds the concept of economic interdependence, 
that, just like interdependence, intertwines the states and makes the option of a conflict or a 
military dispute a very costly one, so states will look for alternative actions, just like Gartzke 
pointed out.16 So the concept of institutional balancing can be linked with Gartzke’s options 
for states to avoid conflict.  
Richard Rosecrance developed further the liberal theory of economic 
interdependence based on the cost-benefit analysis suggested by Angell. For Rosecrance, 
states conduct a cost-benefit analysis to find out the needs and necessity to use force in the 
international system. Liberal economy for Rosecrance is necessary to increase trade. With 
                                                 
13 Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, 2003. Economic Interdependence and International 
Conflict New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate. Michigan Publishing: Univesity of Michigan Press. 
14 Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, Charles Boehmer, „Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and 
International Conflict,“ International Organization, 2001, (55), pp. 391-438. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, 2001. Power and Interdependence. Pearson. 
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the increasing growth of interdependence, both economic and military, the costs of war for 
both interdependent parties becomes too high to pursue their interests via. military actions. 
Since trade is seen now as a more efficient way to gain their objectives, the states within the 
interdependent system will choose a peaceful way to pursue their objectives and interests.17 
In the Western-Europe, the idea of a more integrated society, with strong economic 
links and financial still prevailed after the two great wars and it was believed by liberal 
politicians, that economic and political ties would benefit the region in general and would 
potentially make it if not entirely impossible, but at least very hard to provoke a conflict 
between the Western-European states. All the concepts and ideas described earlier were put 
to test when creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) served the purpose 
of unifying the adversaries of the preceding war. The main idea was based on the liberalism 
argument, that a common market with shared regional integration would make war between 
historic rivals France and Germany "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible".18 
The plan was derived and put together by Robert Schuman and was in some sense one of the 
first big liberal ideas after the League of Nations and the United Nations that withheld in its 
original concept a supra-national legal body that would have had a supervising duty over the 
nations and over some of their policies. But most importantly the idea was to intertwine the 
economies of mostly Germany and France with each other and with Belgium, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands so that the Western-European nations would 
be in an economically interdependent relationship, which would make the occurrence of 
conflicts ever harder. Economic interdependency does not come just as a “thing-in-itself”. It 
is a product of political integration and cooperation that is done within a liberal supra-national 
organization by the supra-national governing institution (that is in turn proportionally 
managed by the member-states). The latter managing system assures that every decision 
made has to be a joint decision, agreed by all the participating members. This ensures a deeper 
level of political integration and fosters cooperative political relations, thus, again increasing 
                                                 
17 Richard N. Rosecrance, 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern 
World. First Edition: Basic Books. 
18 European Union, „About the EU“ available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (accessed 01.05.2016) 
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the level of both political and economic interdependence. The original ECSC project 
developed over time, since it showed and promised real economic and political stability for 
all the participating member-states. This was a real-life proof that the liberal argument of 
deeper political and economic integration between states really does work and proves to be 
useful. Just as Rosecrance pointed out in 1986.19 
The described liberal concepts with the real-life example of the ECSC, that later 
developed into the European Union, withholds another concept in itself that was not 
elaborated that much by the works and concepts cited and referred. Mansfield and Pollins 
described the situation in their described book as follows: ” The idea is that the more opened 
the market between states is, the more trade between nations and foreign market exist, the 
more dependent the state becomes of financial gains originating from the trade itself. But not 
only will the state get dependent on foreign market, foreign trade and foreign direct 
investments, i.e. from foreign inwards capital flows in general, but so does the industrial 
sector become dependent both from imports and exports. This creates a situation where the 
economically dependent actors start to influence the governing regime not to engage in costly 
(military) conflicts. The ruling regime and the political elite in turn are highly dependent on 
the public opinion and on the economically dependent actors (i.e. the business sector). The 
ruling regime receives political, public and financial support from the latter actors and it is 
in their interests not to get engaged in costly (military) conflicts. The concept goes back to 
Montesquieu, who claimed that “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two 
nations that trade together become mutually dependent: if one has an interest of buying, the 
other has an interest in selling; and all unions are based on mutual needs” (quoted in 
Hirschman 1977, 80).20 So we see how economic interdependence between states really does 
foster peace and it seems very logical that due to the dependence of the government from the 
business sector, the government will opt for less costly options when dealing with a potential 
conflict. The well-being of different groups in society and their political support is essential 
                                                 
19 Richard N. Rosecrance, 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern 
World. First Edition: Basic Books.  
20 Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, 2003. Economic Interdependence and International 
Conflict New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate. Michigan Publishing: Univesity of Michigan Press. 
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for the government so they are in some sense bound to choose the less costly option when 
dealing with an “adversary” with whom there is a highly economically interdependent 
relationship. If states A and B are in an economically interdependent dyad and a potential 
conflict arises, in both states, the business sector is dependent on trade with the other member 
of the dyad. So the business sector, along with the rest of the public, will lobby the 
government for a less costly option – i.e. institutional (bi- and multilateral talks between the 
dyadic states, a third party regulated negotiations, international arbitrage, international legal 
institutions like WTO for economic conflicts and ICC in criminal matters) balancing. The 
potential gains from a militarized conflict are not as high as they might seem. Just as 
described earlier through the work of Angell: “Increasing territory is no longer the way to 
increase wealth, given that political administrations change but victory does not ensure a 
transfer of property from one owner to another.”21 
All the previously described principles of liberalism, interdependence and economic 
interdependence clearly show the logic behind interdependence and peace. The liberal theory 
withholds several incentives for states to recuse themselves from potential conflicts and 
clearly indicates the costs and vulnerability of a conflict. The given example of the European 
Union is a great example that proves the liberal arguments and shows how interdependence 
can and has reduced conflict and promoted peace in the region. On the other hand, conflicts 
still arise even if interdependence could be states as high. What is needed to be done, is to 
link the concept of the state with the society. For realists, society in general is not an 
important variable, but as the liberal arguments show, the state is not just an entity, a thing 
in itself, the state is run by politicians who seek economic and public support. So the public 
has the ability to steer the state, to decide its internal and foreign goals - for instance 
interdependence. The European Union works since it is supported by the public, states do not 
act as third parties, states are entities created by societies and run by institutions that are 
derived from the society. So one cannot draw a simple conclusion that the international 
system is anarchic and since states only concern about war, war is always to be expected. 
                                                 
21 Susan M. McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,” Mershshon International Studies Review, 
1997, (41), pp. 33-58. 
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When looking at CIS countries in an interdependent dyad with Russia, it is vital to draw the 
links that connect the state with the society, how does society affect the state and its decisions 
and are there even any connections.  
Realism 
The counter theory of liberalism in the international relations theory is realism. 
Realists do not share the concept that (economic) interdependence reduces the likelihood of 
militarized conflicts and disputes and argue that interdependence and economic 
interdependence are not sufficient incentives for the states that would outweigh the potential 
costs to be gained from a militarized conflict. But not only the aspect of a conflict is different 
for realists, they also see interdependence as a mean for an economically superiors state in a 
dyad to control internally a smaller state towards favorable direction for the stronger party in 
the dyad. Realists describe the situation as asymmetric economic interdependence. 
Asymmetric interdependence, potential gains from a militarized conflict and the 
diametrically different principles of realism and liberalism all describe how it is useful for a 
state, whenever necessary, to be engaged in a conflict and most importantly, in an anarchic 
system, there is no supra-national institution that can really control (not just with binding 
legal measures and sanctions) a state. So states must always be prepared for war and 
interdependence can offer good grounds for states to be engaged in a conflict. As McMillan 
puts it: “From this different starting point, realists come to the conclusion that 
interdependence either increases the likelihood of war or is not related to war initation.”22 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff describe the realistic international system and summarize, 
that in realism, nation-states are the key actors in the international system and they struggle 
for power in an anarchic world system that produces the need for security policies based on 
the “self-help” principle.23 McMillan refers to Betts when trying to find the reasons why 
states get involved in militarized conflicts despite being in an interdependent relationship: 
“Wars happen because nothing prevents them whenever “countries would rather fight than 
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relinquish competing claims” Power is assumed to determine which country will prevail in a 
conflict. Peace is most likely to result from a distribution of power that “convinces states that 
the costs of enforcing or resisting claims exceed the gains.””24 Stanley Hoffmann went as far 
back as to Jean Jacques Rousseau when trying to find the realist assumptions that 
interdependence rather than fostering peace, gives states more reasons to get involved in a 
militarized disputes: “Interdependence breeds not accommodation and harmony, but 
suspicion and incompatibility.”25 So increasing interdependence for realists only increase the 
likelihood of a militarized conflict since first of all war is something to be expected when 
dealing with states, because the international regime is anarchic. Secondly there does not 
exist a mean to prevent wars or to stop states from entering militarized conflicts. Thirdly 
interdependence only increases chaos, suspicion and economic inequality between states. 
“Inequality between states is as a source of insecurity and thus a key source of world 
conflict.”26 So economic interdependence and interdependence in general creates havoc 
between states and makes their intentions towards each-other unclear, which in turn creates 
potential for conflicts and militarized disputes. The effects of dependency for realists are the 
exact opposite as they are for liberals since the international system in general is seen 
differently for states. For realists, the international system is seen as a zero-sum game. Since 
the system is anarchic, security as a strategic goal must always prevail. Even when 
interdependence creates economic wealth and prosperity, the risk of being exposed, i.e. 
vulnerability, increases. A country may become so dependent from its trading partner not 
only through FDI-s and the regular import/export, but also from strategic goods like oil, gas 
and energy. The previously described situation about strategic goods was also emphasized 
by Robert Giplin: “According to the economic nationalists, interdependence leads to 
increasing insecurity because trade yields uncertainty about the continued supply of 
international strategic goods. This heightened insecurity leads to a greater potential of 
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25 Stanley Hoffman, „Rousseau on War and Peacem,“ American PoliticalScience Review, 1963, (57), 
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military conflict” (quoted in McMillan 1997, 41).27  In such a situation, war for a state is a 
solution to escape the asymmetric interdependency and increase its own security over the 
stronger trading partner. McMillan also points out another realist hypothesis, that 
“interdependence has no systematic effect on war because the causes of war lie in political 
and military-strategic considerations.”28 This is a very interesting and relevant argument in 
the light of the current research; according to liberals the described causes are irrelevant, 
since the effect of interdependence rules them out and channels states towards a peaceful 
solution, since not only is it the most effective, but also the most profitable. Considering the 
course of the current research – there is the question, why did Georgia and Russia disavow 
themselves from the interdependent dyad with Russia? Both Russia and Ukraine were in a 
militarized dispute with Russia, when by liberal arguments this should have been the case 
with Russia. But are the described causes of politics and military-strategic considerations the 
key when studying the effects of interdependence on war. A question arises, when will 
interdependence in accordance with peace prevail and when not, are the described realistic 
variables the ones which determine the outcome and cost of war or not? For Buzan and Holsti, 
as described by McMillan, the effects of interdependence were marginal – “political and 
strategic factors will be more important for understanding the outcomes.”29 Economic factors 
on the other hand, derived from interdependence will never be as important and can be 
described as marginal. “Strategic interests are the primary causes of war. It also fits with the 
argument that economic considerations are sacrificed for security interests at times of serious 
conflict.”30 The question arises once more, if by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the Russo-
Gerogian conflict interdependence as a mean was just not enough to avoid conflict and if 
other variables outweighed the costs of war. 
Denney and Gleason describe the exact same situation about economic 
interdependence, as did Mansfield and Pollins in the liberal chapter, but from a realist 
perspective. The basic concept is the same – when two nations are in a trading relationship 
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that develops in an economic interdependence between the two nations. Economic 
interdependence will foster peace. It is derived from the already described Norman Angell’s 
concept that “war in the modern era is economically destructive reflects the general position 
of liberals regarding the nexus between trade and security.” The authors continue: “Liberals 
believe that economic interdependency lessens the likelihood of conflict by restraining 
aggressive behavior of states through economic incentives, granted national leaders are aware 
of the economic benefit.”31 But, at the same time the authors turn the liberal argument of 
economic interdependence fostering peace into a realist argument and ask the question: why 
states trade in the first place? The latter question is answered through a liberal perspective 
referring the work of Norman Angell: “Due to the interconnectedness of the world economy, 
war can no longer be used as a means of enriching states, only as a means to economic 
destruction. Angell’s main argument creates a dichotomy. On the one hand is the pursuit of 
trade and cooperation, leading to an increase in wealth and prosperity between states, so that 
as a result of greater interdependence, war becomes too costly and thus an imprudent 
decision. On the other hand is the pursuit of machtpolitik, representing a strategy whereby 
each state pursues a relative gains strategy focusing on increasing wealth and power at the 
expense of others. The latter strategy, according to Angell’s logic, is the surest way to 
economic ruin and national disaster, since such a strategy increases the probability of an 
economically ruinous war.”32 Angell argues, that the only way the ruling regime will engage 
itself and its state in an act of war, is due to the fact, that they do not know the high economic 
costs of war.  
Realists, as Denney and Gleason describe, point out that dependency and 
interdependence between states creates high level of vulnerability. According to Kenneth 
Waltz, vulnerability is the outcome of the structural effect in the international system. The 
anarchic structure of the international system creates a situation where states are compelled 
to consider their vulnerability vis-à-vis other states. Vulnerability places states into a 
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position, where they are forced to seek ways to control the level of dependence on other 
states.33 The latter is in accordance with the prospects of Ripsman and Blanchard who argued, 
that when states perceive that their level of vulnerability through dependence has increased 
to an inadmissible level relative to their dependency partners, a militarized conflict might be 
seen as a viable and rational decision. The arguments behind war are supported by the main 
realist assumptions, that states operate and compete with each other in an anarchic system 
and that security is the primary goal. So the international system itself forces states to 
prioritize security, even through war, when war can restore the balance of powers between 
the states.34 
Denney and Gleason combine the realist theory of asymmetrical economic 
interdependence of Albert Hirschmann with the critique of Jonathan Kirshner and coin the 
two together into the Hirschman-Kirshner Theory. “Kirshner’s critique of Hirschman’s 
theory that larger states use asymmetric trading relationships to increase national power 
revolves around the concept of influence. Kirshner’s interpretation of Hirschman’s theory 
posits the idea that large states use political leverage in asymmetric trading relationships with 
small states to redefine the smaller state’s perception of its own national interests.”35 The 
authors continue to summarize Kirshner: “Hirschman’s National Power, according to 
Kirshner, “shows that the pattern of international economic relations affects domestic 
politics, which in turn shape the orientation of foreign policy” of the smaller state. “This 
effect is always present but most consequential in asymmetric relations, where the effects are 
typically large, visible, and almost wholly found within the smaller economy.””36 The idea 
behind the Hirschmann-Kirshner theory is, that when two states, A and B are in an 
economically asymmetric interdependent dyad, the larger, economically more able and 
capable state A will offer the smaller party in the dyad, i.e. state B economic incentives for 
instance through a Most Favorable Nation agreement between the states A and B. The offered 
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incentives will favor the local business sector of state B and will channel the business sector 
towards state A and eventually the business sector will become dependent on state’s A 
internal market. This in return will have an effect on the attitude, behavior and goals of the 
smaller state’s business sector. They will start to affect the ruling regime to take favorable 
policies towards state A, since the costs of doing otherwise are very high. The exact situation 
was also describe in the liberalism subsection, but the liberal argument is, that the ruling 
regime will adapt the policies recommended by the business sector, since the ruling regime 
needs the support and the financial aid of the business sector in order to maintain their 
political leadership position. The business sector is also strongly intertwined with the public 
in general and can alter the public opinion favorably or negatively towards the ruling regime. 
So the government, in order to maintain its position, needs to listen and shape its policies 
towards state A, because the costs of doing otherwise would be harsh for not only the ruling 
regime, but for the financial and economic health of country B. As Denney and Gleason put 
it: “At this point, a preliminary conclusion can be drawn. Hirschman’s classical approach and 
Kirshner’s modern interpretation support the notion that trade between large and small states 
is less a matter of commercial interests and more a matter of political and strategic concerns. 
The larger state is seeking to achieve international political and strategic goals.”37 
So it is clear, that liberal interdependence can foster peace, but it can also be used as 
a tool of altering the internal policies of a country when interdependence is turned into 
asymmetric interdependence. The concept is pretty straightforward, but also creates 
questions – when talking about strategic goods, realists like Gilpin argue, that in such a 
position war is actually the only viable option in order to escape the costly interdependent 
relationship and the public opinion does not matter. This shows that there are contradictions 
in the realist concept about the relationship of economic interdependence and war. In the 
current research the same question arises when looking at the CIS countries in an economic 
interdependent relationship with a much stronger (economically and military) partner – 
Russia. At first glance it would seem that the Hirschmann-Kirshner theory does not always 
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apply, when talking about Georgia and Ukraine. On the other hand it just might be true with 
the rest of the states analyzed in this research.  
All the variables used in the current research are derived from the theoretical concepts 
of liberalism and realism analyzed in this chapter and have been selected as the most 
applicable for the current research.  
Independent Variable 
In the current research the independent variable is economic interdependence. 
Economic interdependence is measured through imports from Russia and exports to Russia 
as a percentage from the GDP of the dyads smaller state. For instance Armenia’s exports to 
Russia plus Armenia’s imports to Russia as a percentage of Armenia’s GDP. The latter is 
made through a mathematical formula, used by Russett, Oneal and Davis in their 1998 
analysis “The third leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and 
Militarized Disputes, 1950-85,”38  
Due to the lack of trustworthy and official statistics, the timespan of the current 
research is from 2000 – 2014 (2014 being the last year from official statistics has been 
published). Data about external trade between Russia and the rest of the CIS countries is 
collected from the Russian Federation Federal Statistics Service database. Gathering and 
using data from one source minimalizes the chances of deflection in dependency calculations, 
since using official data from every single member state might cause a deviation in the end 
results. The official statistics published by the CIS member states tends to differ from the 
official statistics published by Russia. For the latter reason official statistics, calculated by 
the same methodology, from Russia is being used in order to minimize the differences in 
statistics and to minimize the potential differences in end results that might occur when using 
statistics from every member-state.  
The second aspect of economic interdependence is measured with inward Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) as a percentage of GDP. Foreign Direct Investments play a key role 
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in a countries development. Research conducted by Qiang and Mawugnon39, Sandalcilar and 
Altiner40, Heang and Moolio41, as well as Iqbal and Anwar42 all show the importance of FDI-
s in the development of a developing country. FDI-s very broadly means cash – money is 
invested from abroad into a country in order to get financial gains back from the investment. 
But it is not just only capital that defines FDI-s. There is also technology, even distribution 
of sources, capital efficiency increasing, increasing in efficiency in general, increase in high-
end labor force, relevant know-how in the business sector etc. These described positive 
effects also make it for the target country to modernize its economy and also grants easier 
access to foreign markets, due to more competitive products. The latter positive impacts 
derived from and with FDI-s, all create a spill-over effect in the economy. That is – 
modernizing the economy will help to create jobs, improve education, increase wages and 
most importantly, it gives the government capital in terms of received tax money from the 
private sector.  
Sandalcilar and Altiner have descbribed the positive impacts of FDI-s as follows: 
“The most important impact of FDIs is their net contribution to host country income. FDI’s 
influence over host country’s economy can be analyzed by two channels. The first is the 
contribution of FDIs to the sector of intermediate goods which is also defined as growth 
effect and the increasing specialization of input producers by this way. The second is the 
externality effect stemming from R&D activities. Thus, domestic firms can benefit from 
advanced knowledge of foreign enterprises.”43 Sandalcilar and Altiner continue to describe 
the effects of FDI-s into a countries economy, citing Karluk and Moosa themselves: “FDIs 
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can be evaluated by treating them as a special kind of capital transfer. Accordingly they have 
two characteristics: Firstly, FDIs may enhance competitiveness of host country by bringing 
“specialization” and “know-how”. Secondly, FDIs directed to industrial sectors may be seen 
as a transfer of capital between capital sectors of two countries. Briefly, positive influences 
of FDIs on production factors in industrial sectors make a direct impact on economic growth. 
According to the studies performed, FDIs make contribution to capital accumulation in host 
country, ensure training and hence specialization of labour force, increase entrepreneurship 
skills and enable better use of natural sources. What is more, one of the features that 
differentiate FDIs from other investments is the fact that FDIs have a control power on the 
management policy and decisions of the business.”44 They conclude their research: “The 
effect of FDI inflow on the economic growth achieved in process cannot be denied in the 
countries gained their independence after 1990s (primarily Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).”45  
Data from the World Bank, international Monetary Fund, European Commission 
Directorate-General of Trade and from the Russian Federation Federal State Statistics 
Service, also from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The latter organization is 
useful, since it provides the necessary statistical data on all the CIS member states based on 
the same methodology. Using the statistics services of all the individual countries might 
compromise the credibility of the data, since all the individual CIS member states might want 
to manipulate the data by showing inward FDI stocks from Russia either larger or smaller 
due to different political reasons in the relations with Russia. 
Control Variables 
Energy dependence - energy dependence is a very important variable when analyzing 
the existence of dependence and interdependence. Dependence from energy can prevail even 
when dependence from foreign trade and foreign direct investments is not noteworthy and 
remains under a given threshold (five percent of GDP in this research). Energy dependence 
in the current study means the concept of natural gas imports from Russia and the end 
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consumption as a percentage of total natural gas consumption. Finon and Locatelli studied 
the (inter)dependence of the European Union and Russia in the context of contractual gas 
deals.  Russia’s new geopolitical and foreign policy goals in the “near abroad” countries and 
the aim to strengthen its positions in the Eastern-European/CIS countries, but also in the 
European capitals is achieved under Putin’s administration through the energy giant 
Gazprom. Russia was trying to become an “energy power” and the companies representing 
the Russian state in gas and oil deals “also underpin foreign policy goals and their action is 
not restricted exclusively to Russian resources and the domestic markets.”46 Russia is seeking 
to gain influence in the energy sector in the energy dependent countries to secure revenues 
and alter the states foreign policy favorably to Moscow. “The deliberate politicisation of the 
gas issue by the Putin government as a way of affirming Russia’s ambitions to recover its 
international influence undoubtedly contributed to creating interference between energy trade 
and foreign policy.”47 Such an analysis is also provided by Jack D. Sharples, who analyzed 
Gazprom’s (and its predecessors) policies from the 1970s until the 2010s. Sharples stated, 
that Gazprom’s long term policy reflects a strategy towards long term dependency for Europe 
from the Russian gas.48 Adam N. Stulberg has also studied the complex issue of Russian-EU 
gas interdependence in the light of 2013/14 Russian-Ukrainian war. Stulberg concludes, that 
Gazprom is merely a tool for president Putin in order to secure its influence in Europe and to 
help achieve Russia its foreign policy goals. It also serves as a tool in the European capitals 
to influence Brussels official policy towards Moscow. Gazprom has managed to tighten the 
grip on natural gas supplies in Germany and is hoping for an internal lobby that would 
eventually change the foreign policy course towards Russia.49 The Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies issued a report in the fall of 2014 about the dependence of Russian gas in the 
the European Union. The report analyzes the complex energy relations between Brussels and 
Moscow in the light of the Ukrainian conflict and clearly states, that Moscow might likely 
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use its natural gas exports to the EU as a weapon in order to fulfill its political and strategic 
aims.50 The described theoretical and analytical analysis about how Russia uses natural gas 
as a (geo)political tool in order to gain its foreign policy aims and to secure its economic 
interests in Europe proves that in relations with Russia, in this case in several dyadic relations, 
when energy carriers, especially natural gas, are involved, they are used by Russia as political 
tools to keep the energy dependent countries related to Russia. For the latter reasons energy 
dependence is looked as a control variable in this current research. 
Regime Type – regime type has been used as a control variable in several studies that 
have examined the connection of interdependence and conflict. Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 
used regime type as a control variable in their probit analysis model when finding positive 
correlations between interdependence and conflict. Gartzke et al. did mark regime type as an 
insignificant variable because of covariance with capital values, it indicated that variance in 
regime type is subsumed by greater variation in these economic variables.51 Gartzke and Li 
used the probit analysis model once more in 2003 when trying to find if states whose capital 
markets are more integrated with into the global economy are less likely to experience 
militarized disputes between them. Dyadic Democracy was added as a control variable for 
regime type, varying from democracy and autocracy. Gartzke and Li found that joint 
democracy has a pacifying effect in a dyadic relationship, although regime differences are 
significant across their models.52 The question here is, if taken into account the liberal 
argument that democracies do not go to war against each other, does it also apply on other 
regimes as well? Or does it contrary increase the likelihood of conflict between the members 
of a dyad. The question is important, since all the reviewed states in the current research are 
not full democratic regimes and are semi-autocratic or autocratic regimes. Taken these 
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indicators into account, how do they affect the relationship of economic interdependence and 
war. 
Public opinion – various researches have showed the importance of public opinion in the 
political decision making process, even in foreign policy. In the current case the decision 
whether or not to go to war, even when constrained by interdependence, is dependent on the 
public opinion. Whether the public supports war or not. War in itself is the most extreme case 
of a military dispute, but the issue might also be in a secession (supported by the military). 
A change in the public perception about the second party in a dyad can cause also a revolution 
(Ukraine back in 2013). The public discourse in a democratic regime is very important, 
several authors have suggested, that it might not be that important in semi-authoritarian or 
authoritarian states, since the ruling regime does not depend so much (if all) from the public 
support. Ripsman and Blanchard describe the situation with the example of the Third Reich, 
Britain and France in 1936: “despite their awareness of vulnerability, German leaders did not 
consider it relevant when they decided to go to war in 1914; ideological and security concerns 
overrode the constraints of dependence. Similarly, British and French economic sensitivity 
played almost no role in the Western reaction to German actions in 1936. Rather, strategic 
concerns and deference to public opinion were more important in decision making.”53 As 
Susan M. McMillan puts in her analysis of economic interdependence and conflict: 
“Unfortunately, this conclusion leaves open the question of how economic ties affect public 
opinion. If public opinion is influenced by the benefits (costs) of interdependence, as modeled 
by Arad and Hirsch (1981), then a case could still be made that Britain’s decision was 
constrained in the ways political and economic liberals would expect. This is not the 
interpretation that Ripsman and Blanchard made of the findings however.”54 McMillan 
concludes the discussion about public opinion as follows: “several case studies suggest public 
opinion is considered by decision makers. These studies, however, leave open the question 
of how international economic ties might affect public opinion—the causal mechanism 
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through which political liberalism connects interdependence to less war.”55 So the role of the 
public opinion is towards the opposite party of the dyad could determine the actions of a 
government towards the opposite party as described by Ripsman and Blanchard. Yet the 
public opinion towards the ruling regime and towards the opposite party might spark a 
secession (a civil war even) as happened with the divided regions of Ukraine and the public’s 
perception of Russia and the same logic also applies for the Rose Revolution in Georgia back 
in 2003, the Orange revolution in Ukraine back in 2005, the Russo-Ukrainian war back in 
2008 and for the 2013 Euromaidan events in Ukraine. The public played a remarkable role 
in the latter crises, since the public perception was in some sense diametrically different from 
the ruling government discourse towards Russia.  
Corruption – in several researches has corruption marked as one of the key indicators of 
public and social unrest. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills have investigated how different 
level of corruption in different regime types, as well as in different economies, affect the 
public perception of the government and the ruling regime in general. “In an authoritarian 
developmental state, collusive corruption is inevitable, being the optimal survival strategy 
for the local elites who face no democratic constraints from below and know how to use the 
advantage of information by other local elites poses the most dangerous threat. The optimal 
strategy for eliminating this threat is to cooperate – indeed collude – with these elites.” 56 The 
authors conclude: “The more that an authoritarian regime must depend on the same agents, 
whose corruption is endangering the long-term survival of the regime, to maintain the regime’s 
security and power, the more the autocracy is ill-positioned to fight corruption; a serious anti-
corruption drive will likely turn many of the regime’s most loyal agents into its fierce foes 
and put the survival of the regime at great risk.”57 They even go as far and state: “In other 
words, corruption by the insiders of the regime is the Achilles’ heel of an authoritarian 
developmental state.”58  
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Not only is corruption costly for the ruling regime and not only does it foster even more 
corruption in order to uphold the system. High levels of corruption might eventually foster 
the need for a change in the society through several civil society movements, online media 
protests and prompt demonstrations organized through social media. It can also evoke large 
scale public protests and perhaps even revolutions. A non-democratic authoritarian regime 
that is highly dependent on corruption can generate even more problems: 
1. A centralized state that is highly dependent on the ruling regime and the so called 
capital can create dissatisfaction within the public, since the public perception might see the 
ruling regime throughout the state as the liable unit. When the local governments have no 
real power in the decision making process and a lot of the wealth generated within a sub-
region is channeled to the core, it could cause public unsatisfaction within the local 
population. 
2. On the other hand, when the state is decentralized, as Ukraine was, the local 
authorities is given more power in decision making. That might be a good thing when done 
correctly, but without the necessary democratic regime, the decentralized state could create 
a hotbed for local oligarchs and their rule over the region. The local regime might grow 
sufficiently strong and become less dependent from the central power. Such a situation might 
create more corruption within the local elites and suppress civil society movements, freedom 
of speech, hinder economic development and eventually make the local regime independent 
from the central government. This might lean the public opinion not only against the local 
government, but also against the central government as well. 
3. There is also a third option, a “Ukrainian” option. This is well described by Allison 
Smith, in her article “International Actors in Ukraine’s Revolution to Democracy From 2004 
to 2014.” ”Yanukovych had constructed a powerful local political machine in the Donbas 
region, an eastern region known for its corruption and use of state resources for regional gain, 
which allowed him to deliver Kuchma the vote in 1999 in exchange for hands-off approach 
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in the region.”59 The thought is elaborated by Andres Aslund: “Kuchma also saw that 
Yanukovych represented the strongest clan of the oligarchs in Donetsk and that he received 
support from three groups of oligarchs in Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kiev, making him 
the best possible candidate for the government that was mostly comprised of oligarchs and 
policies that benefited their interests.”60 This shows the interdependence between oligarchs 
and the central power, but also the interdependence with the ruling regime in Moscow. The 
economy of the Eastern-Ukrainian regions was based on heavy industries like steel, coal and 
military industries. Ukraine inherited up to a third of the Soviet Union’s military industry and 
“although Russia and Ukraine moved apart in the political sphere, they remained closely 
integrated in defence industry and military R&D.”61 So the industry in general remained not 
only closely linked with Russia, but it also remained highly dependent on Russia’s money. 
This only increased the ties of the already Russian biased oligarchs even more and also linked 
the ruling regime with Minsk. President Viktor Yanukovich built a system that allowed him 
and the members of his system to stay in power somewhat independently from the publics 
will, since the system was also financially very well funded through the oligarchs economic 
and financial ties with Russia. As Smith concludes: “He consolidated his power by 
overturning the constitutional changes that were made after the Orange Revolution. 
Yanukovych used his new powers to replace all government officials with those who were 
loyal to him, giving his political party full control. Yanukovych also had Timoshenko sent to 
jail on the charges that she had made a bad business deal with Russia.”62 
Liberals argue that one of the indicators of Arab Spring was the very high level of 
corruption in those states that eventually helped to spark the revolutions against the ruling 
                                                 
59 Allison Smith, 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate 
Conference on Global Affairs, 2015. „International Actors in Ukraine’s Revolution to Democracy From 2004 
to 2014” available at: Drake.edu (accessed 12.05.2016). 
60 Andres Aslund, Michael McFaul, 2006. The Ancien Regime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs. Carnegie 
Endownment for International Peace 
61 Christopher Mark Davis, “The Ukraine conflict, asymmetric economic dependence. Russia should 
have increased its influence and power over the nations, linking them so much with its own economy, that the 
cost of war would have outweighed the economic and political potential gain.economic–military power 
balances and economic sanctions,” Post-Communist Economies, 2016, 167-198 
62 Allison Smith, 2nd Annual Nelson Institute for Diplomacy and International Affairs - Undergraduate 
Conference on Global Affairs, 2015. „International Actors in Ukraine’s Revolution to Democracy From 2004 
to 2014” available at: Drake.edu (accessed 12.05.2016). 
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regime. So there seems to be no win-win solution for the ruling government when dealing 
with high level government and government related corruption. It seems that eventually this 
will wear the system down and will create unrest within the public.  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the current research is a militarized interstate conflict. In 
the current research, conflict is considered as a conflict, when one of the two parties in a dyad 
has officially declared war. A militarized conflict between the dyad members, lasting only 
for a brief period of time is considered not a conflict in the current research since although it 
represents a clash of state interests, but when remaining as a single incident in a longer time 
span (for instance a single incident within two years, it still is and can be considered as a 
single act of display of force, but is not relevant in the current research, since there was not 
a conflict escalation into a war. The use of militarized force does not constitute as a large 
scale militarized conflict, i.e. war in this research. International law defines war as the use of 
violence and force between two or more states to resolve a matter of dispute. The United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of Aggression states 
that a war can be present due to the nature of the conflict even without a declaration of war 
from one of the involved parties.63 In the current research one of two requirements is needed 
in order to define what is counted as a war between a dyad members and not just a 
(militarized) conflict. First of all a large or full scale use of militarized force on one or both 
sides is needed. Secondly, the declaration of war from one of the involved parties is 
necessary. When one of those two criterions are fulfilled, the militarized interstate dispute is 
considered as war in the current research. 
The hypothesis of this research is that the complex interdependence system (derived 
from, economic dependence, energy independence, corruption, regime type and public 
opinion) will decrease the likelihood of war within the members of the complex 
interdependent system.   
                                                 
63 United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008. “Definition of Aggression” 
available at: http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/da/da_e.pdf (accessed 12.05.2016). 
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Research Design 
The conceptual theoretical framework of this thesis is based on several research 
designs written over the last three decades, describing the (causal) relationship of economic 
interdependence and peace. The main base of the current research is derived from Keohane 
& Nye’s theory of complex interdependence64, coined with the liberal argument on Kantian 
peace in a dependent relationship with economic interdependence, developed further by 
theorists like Michael Doyle65, Erik Gartzke, Qaun Li, Charles Boehmer66, Albert O. 
Hirschmann67 68, Richard Rosecrance69, Peter Cain70, Arthur R. Stein71, and others.  
The main idea of the research is to find comprehensive and extensive evidence that 
interdependence in a dyadic relationship can minimize the chances of a militarized disputes 
between the dyad members. The dyads used in the current research are Russia and its CIS 
partners, who have ratified the CIS charter, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. As well as Georgia, who was a CIS member until 18 
August 2008 and Ukraine, who was both economically and politically one of the key partners 
for Russia in the Eastern-European region and also operated with large amounts economics 
wise in the CIS. The data analyzed in the current research should either present evidence to 
support the liberal theory of interdependence – that interdependence prevents the likelihood 
of conflict or if the conflicts between Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Georgia constitute as a 
failure of interdependence. In order to answer the latter question, the level of economic 
interdependence between the examined dyads is calculated and used as an Independent 
                                                 
64 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, 2001. Power and Interdependence. Pearson. 
65 Michael Doyle, „Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,“ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983a, 
pp. 205-235. 
66 Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, Charles Boehmer, „Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and 
International Conflict,“ International Organization, 2001, (55), pp. 391-438 
67 Albert O. Hirschmann, 1978.The Passion and the Interests. Princeton:Princeton University Press. 
68 Albert O. Hirschmann, 1980. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
69 Richard Rosecrance, 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern 
World. New York: BasicBooks.  
70 Peter Cain, „Capitalism, War and Internationalism in the Thought of Richard Cobden,“ British 
Journal of International Studies, 1979, pp. 229-247 
71 Arthur R. Stein, „Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Conflict,“ Behavior, 
Society and International Conflict, 1993, pp. 241-324. 
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Variable. Adding to the independent variable three control variables ‘Regime Type’, ‘Public 
Opinion’ and ‘Corruption’ it is possible to determine the scope of interdependence between 
the dyad members and if economic interdependence alone can prevent or decrease the 
likelihood of conflicts, or the deescalating effects (if there are any) is only significant when 
the mentioned control variables are significantly existing with interdependence. If they are 
present in the case of Russia-Georgia and Russia-Ukraine, it is the question why did war 
break out between the members of the dyad. This means a positive correlation between 
interdependence and conflict has to be found. The latter option would provide strong 
evidence against the liberal theory of interdependence. If a positive correlation occurs 
between complex interdependence and peace, it would suggest that the realist argument that 
interdependent increases the likelihood of war is based on wrong assumptions. In order to 
find the answers for the proposed correlations, it is vital to locate the major sources of conflict 
between Russia-Georgia and Russia-Ukraine that can be used to determine if the two latter 
conflicts were bound to happen whether complex interdependence was existent or not. In 
both cases they can be used as counterfactuals analysis with the other CIS member states on 
whom economic interdependence prevails and are needed to be examined further. In addition 
to the potential correlation between interdependence and conflict, the three control variables 
are being studied and their potential effect to the correlation between interdependence and 
conflict. 
Operationalization of Variables 
Independent variable  
Economic interdependence is the current research is measured as a percentage of the 
host states GDP. The two major indicators used to measure economic interdependence are 
international trade flows (import and export) and foreign direct investments (FDI). Both 
values are measured as a percentage of the recipient country’s GDP. The two values are 
added up to get an end value, again measured as a percentage of the host countries GDP. The 
end value represents the recipient state’s dependence from the host state as a percentage of 
the recipient state’s GDP. This operationalization gives an opportunity to measure 
dependency based on official data and statistics and will show a neutral measurable value 
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that cannot be interpreted as somewhat biased towards one of the states in the dyad looked 
at. The time range is from the year 2000 until 2014. The year 2000 was chosen for the 
beginning of the research since it was the year Vladimir Putin was elected as the new 
president of the Russian Federation and this marked a change in the Russian foreign policy 
doctrine. Geopolitics, realism in foreign policy and the “near abroad” policy of the former 
president Boris Yeltsin was altered to the “sphere of influence” policy under president Putin 
in the beginning of 2000s. The data is measured for years 2000, 2005, 2009-2014. This is 
due to the reason that trustworthy statistics about the period of early 2000s is very 
inconsistent and hard to find. This would create a situation where the data might not be usable 
and the end results compromised.  
Economic Interdependence will be measured through foreign direct investments in a 
dyad and through foreign trade (export (X) and import (Y)) in a dyad. Then, the values are 
calculated the economic importance of trade to the gross domestic product (GDP). The 
interdependence of a country i on trade with j is DEPENDij which equals Xij + Mij/GDPi.  
DEPENDij = Xij + Mij/GDPi 
 
The percentage of foreign direct investments in a countries GDP is measured in the 
current research with the following equation: 
FDI inward stock (% of GDP) = FDIj/GDPi x 100% 
The two values of the independent variable – dependence on trade as a percentage of 
the host countries GDP, as well as FDI-s as a percentage of GDP are combined together in 
order to determine and measure the interdependence of the host country from in our case, 
Russia. In order to isolate significant dependency cases from non-significant dependency 
cases, the calculated dependency has to excel a five percent threshold set in this research. 
The threshold was set in place since when an economy in a dyad is affected directly under 
the amount of 5% of the total GDP, one can not imply on economic dependence or 
interdependence. The latter variable being the independent variable in this research, it is not 
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viable to study the effects of economic interdependence on peace, when there is no economic 
interdependence between the members of a dyad. 
Control variables 
Energy dependence is marked as significant when the total share of net imports from 
Russia exceeds 25% and the total production of energy exceeds 25% from natural gas. This 
threshold was created for the current research based on the work of Finon and Locatelli72 and 
on the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies report.73 A lower indicator might not show the 
dependent nature of the analyzed dyad. 
Level of democracy is measured based on the Economist Intelligent Units published 
data on Regime Type and Level of Democracy in the world. Coded 1 – 10 from least to most. 
EIU’s level of democracy is in a correlation with regime types. That is the lower the level of 
democracy score, the more it indicates the regime is authoritarian and vice versa. Using EIU’s 
data will offer a neutral third party evaluation about the level of democracy in the researched 
states.  
Public opinion is measured through various third party institutions who have 
conducted public opinion polls about the perception of Russia, its government and actions 
towards other states in the recipient states of the dyad. Public opinion is measured on a 
percentage scale coded 0 – 100 where 0 marks the least possible amount of support towards 
Russia and 100 the maximum possible amount of support towards Russia.  
Corruption is measured using data from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception index. Just like with the first two control variables, corruption is measured as a 
value on a scale from 0 – 100, where 100 indicates the least possible amount of corruption 
and 0 the highest perceived amount of corruption. It is important to note, that until 2011, 
                                                 
72 Dominique Finon, Catherine Locatelli, „Russian and European gas interdependence: Could 
contractual trade channel geopolitics?“ Energy Policy, 2008, (36), pp. 423-442. 
73 Ralf Dickel et al., The Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, 2014. “Reducing European Dependence 
on Russian Gas: distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics” available at: 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf (accessed 22.02.2016). 
  
39 
 
corruption index was published on a scale from 0 – 10, where 10 indicated the least possible 
amount of corruption and 0 the highest perceived amount of corruption.  
Independent variable 
Interstate militarized conflict is counted as war in the current research when one of 
two conditions are fulfilled. First of all a large or full scale use of militarized force on one or 
both sides is needed. Secondly, the declaration of war from one of the involved parties is 
necessary. When one of those two criterions are fulfilled, the militarized interstate dispute is 
considered as war in the current research. 
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Results 
CIS dyads 
In this chapter, all the results about the dyads studied is presented. The timeframe is 
selected to reflect the years of Georgian and Ukrainian crisis in order to present a bigger 
comparative picture between the dyads studied. 
Table 1. Dependence as % of GDP (Foreign trade + Inward FDI), Index of Democracy, Corruption Perception 
Index. All countries. Source: Authors own calculations. Economic dependence formula by Russet, O’Neal, 
Davis, 1998. Original data originating from the World Bank, Russian Federal Federation Federal State Statistics 
Service, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, United Nations Database, Transparency International, 
Corruption Perception Index Database, Economist Intelligent Unit Index of Democracy. 
The comparative table shows the differences and similarities between the examined 
states. All the states, except for Ukraine and Georgia, are linked with Russia through the 
Commonwealth of Independent states. Georgia was a full member until 2008 and although 
Ukraine was one of the three founding members of CIS, the Ukrainian parliament never 
ratified the unions Charter, this was also the case with Turkmenistan. The biggest difference 
between Ukraine, Georgia and the rest of the CIS states, is that the first two have been 
engaged, or are engaged in a large scale interstate militarized dispute.  
 As seen from the comparative table of all the states studied, economic dependence 
only prevailed with dyads between Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus. Moldova’s 
dependence has declined to a marginal 1,49% in 2014.  
 
Country 2014 2013 2009 2008 2014 2013 2009 2008 2014 2013 2009 2008
Armenia 5,13 4,10 3,42 4,09 4,13 4,02 n/a 4,09 37,00 36,00 2,60 2,90
Azerbaijan 0,85 0,95 0,85 1,10 2,83 3,06 n/a 3,19 29,00 28,00 2,40 1,90
Belarus 16,54 20,55 16,78 19,45 3,69 3,04 n/a 3,34 31,00 29,00 2,40 2,00
Kazakhstan 3,65 2,90 4,18 5,12 3,17 3,06 n/a 3,45 29,00 26,00 2,90 2,20
Kyrgystan 1,81 1,93 8,02 9,83 5,24 4,69 n/a 4,05 27,00 24,00 2,00 1,80
Moldova 1,49 5,93 8,62 11,21 6,32 6,32 n/a 6,50 35,00 35,00 2,90 2,90
Tajikistan 0,38 0,06 4,67 4,73 2,37 2,51 n/a 2,45 23,00 22,00 2,10 2,00
Uzbekistan 1,47 2,05 3,29 6,21 2,45 1,72 n/a 1,74 18,00 17,00 1,60 1,80
Ukraine 7,91 9,01 8,49 9,24 5,42 5,84 n/a 6,94 26,00 25,00 2,20 2,50
Georgia 2,26 1,42 0,24 0,92 5,82 5,95 n/a 4,62 52,00 49,00 4,10 3,90
Dependence as a % of GDP Index of Democracy Corruption
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All in all the economic dependence varied from 0,06% for Tajikistan in 2013 up to 
the described 5,13% for Armenia in 2014. Other than that, the dependence measured was not 
significant and since economic interdependence is the main base for determining whether to 
apply the model of complex interdependence, the findings did not support to use the complex 
interdependence model on those states in order to study their dyadic relationship with Russia. 
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Energy dependence, as a % of net imports 
from Russia 
Country 2014 2013 2009 2008 
 
Gas 
import 
Gas 
import 
Gas 
import 
Gas 
import 
Armenia 84,12 93,00 109,67 110,52 
Azerbaijan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Belarus 107,10 108,19 109,00 109,89 
Kazakhstan 90,07 102,17 52,54 91,42 
Kyrgystan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Moldova 99,90 99,90 99,90 99,90 
Tajikistan 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Uzbekistan 0,00 0,66 0,00 0,00 
          
Ukraine 34,00 92,00 80,77 93,70 
Georgia 2,80 0,00 9,80 34,00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Energy dependence, 
as a % of net imports from 
Russia. Source: Authors 
own calculations. Original 
data originating from 
Gazprom, Forbes, Knoema, 
Index Mundi, British 
Petroleum, Arka News 
Agency, Energy Regulators 
Regional Association. 
 
 Table 2 shows the energy dependence from Russia, measured as a percentage of a 
countries net imports from Russia. The data indicates, that the –stan states, although being 
active CIS members, have decreased their economic dependence on Russia from the first 
year observed (Russo-Georgian war). This indicates that the states have re-modeled their 
economy in the sense that they do not rely and depend almost not at all from Russia. The –
stan states are trading more with themselves, with the EU, India and China, who has become 
the biggest market for the –stan states energy. They are competing with Russia for energy 
deals and potential infrastructure to Europe and China and are economically more 
competitors than allies. The fact, that Kazakstan is importing natural gas from Russia, is due 
to the lack of infrastructure in Kazakhstan that is oriented for export and not for internal use. 
The infrastructure for domestic use are in development, but the export infrastructure to the 
Caucasus region, Pakistan-India, Europe and China is economically more important than the 
domestic infrastructure. Kazakhstan has vast natural gas reserves and is a natural gas exporter 
and due to the shared natural gas infrastructure with Russia, Kazakhstan is importing natural 
gas for domestic usage and at the same time is exporting gas to Russia or channeling Russian 
gas to the Caucasus region. The high number of energy dependence does not tell the real 
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story here. By looking at the whole natural gas sector of Kazakhstan, one can state, that the 
economic interdependence between Russia and Kazakhstan (including economic 
interdependence) does not come forth. Kazakhstan is more interdependent economically with 
China than it is with Russia. The rest of the –stan states are also trying to balance themselves 
between the East and the West, focusing their economy more towards the EU, the Caucasus 
region and China, than towards Russia. China with its still high energy demands is a reliable 
and good partner for the region who is also investing heavily through FDI-s into the region 
economies and is creating joint ventures with the local enterprises.  
 Azerbaijan does not classify as a dependent state in a dyad with Russia as well. As a 
natural gas net exporter, Azerbaijan does not depend economically nor energetically from 
Russia in any way. Azerbaijan has turned its economy also towards the EU and the Caucasus 
region, competing with other Caspian Sea states for a share in the natural gas export market 
to the EU and to the rest of ‘East’. 
 Armenia and Moldova do not have their own natural gas reserves and are highly 
dependent on Russian natural gas exports. Armenia has decreased its level of dependence 
from Russian gas, but on the same time has increased its economic dependence from Russia. 
Although the statistics here is presented until 2014, due to the lack of trustworthy newer data, 
it is a fact that Armenia joined the EEU in 2015 and seems to integrate its economy, regarding 
foreign trade and inward FDI flows more with Russia than with the EU. In order to get a 
clearer picture, Armenia is analyzed more in-depth. 
 Moldova is fully dependent from Russian natural gas, as Russia being the sole 
exporter of natural gas into Moldova. Moldova’s economic dependence from Russia was also 
significantly high between the years 2008 – 2013. Extending from 11,21% in 2008 to 5,93% 
in 2013. In 2014, the dependence fell down to a relatively marginal 1,49%. The latter number 
might indicate that the former dependence does not exist anymore, but the energy dependence 
figures might suggest otherwise. In order to get a clearer picture, the dyad between Moldova-
Russia is analyzed more deeply. 
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Democracy Index by itself does not tell you much. Democracy index in 2008 for 
Georgia was 4,62, even a bit lower than 2006, when it was 4,90. After the Russo-Georgian 
war in 2008, the democracy index even fell by a margin to 4,59. From the first index 
published in 2006 up until 2014, Georgia has remained a hybrid regime and by just looking 
at the data, one could not see an implication for a conflict. The same actually applies for 
Ukraine as well, if anything, the democracy index and regime type fell, i.e. Ukraine became 
politically closer with Russia. The two regimes started to resemble. Nevertheless in the end 
of 2013, student protests in Kiev escalated into an ongoing war with Russia. When looking 
at the other CIS countries, nothing indicates a severe clash of interests and ideologies between 
the dyad members. 
 Corruption perception index years are also chosen to reflect any significant deviance 
in during the previous, ongoing, and after years of Russo-Georgian war and Russo-Ukrainian 
war. As was the case with Ukraine and Belarus, in highly corrupt and economically 
dependent states, the two variables can evolve into a triadic nexus that intertwines the 
political with business and links the two dyadic states. Such a development makes it harder 
for a state to break itself apart from the system, since complex interdependence prevails. 
Again, the presented data does not suggest that would be the case with the other dyads looked 
into.  
 The reasons for the lack of interdependence may also lie in geography. Although 
Russia’s foreign policy under president Putin values its newly found policies like the sphere 
of influence, CIS and the near abroad policy. But the truth is, when almost nothing connects 
the two countries, not even a border and their economic and political relations are modest, 
conflict is hard to prevail. Gartzke and Li used geographic distance as a control variable when 
testing a model of interdependence and peace and one of their findings was that geographic 
distance fosters peace between power dyads.74This might just be the case with –stan states 
and Azerbaijan. Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia mark the border between the East and the 
West for Russia and border areas are always worth to control. A lack of economic 
                                                 
74 Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, „War, Peace and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of 
Economic Globalization,“ International Studies Quarterly, 2003, (47), pp. 561-586. 
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dependence, a lack of energy dependence and a lack of a mutual border are all indicators that 
dramatically decrease the potential for complex interdependence to evolve between states. 
The CIS countries who are not economically and energetically intertwined with Russia and 
are also geographically insignificant do not hold such a value for Russia, as simple as that. 
Since economic dependence and energy dependence form the bases of complex 
interdependence in this research, the –stan states with Azerbaijan (and their lack of economic 
and energy dependence from Russia) are not being studied further in this research.  
 The states that are going to be analyzed more specifically in the current chapter, are 
chosen based on evaluating the data and findings on economic dependence and energy 
dependence. The latter two variables form the base pillars for complex interdependence to 
arise and when the threshold of these two variables are exceeded. The dyads are analyzed 
more thoroughly if the two mentioned variables prevail with geographic relevance (to some 
extent). Other control variables described in the theoretical framework are added in to the 
analysis in order to determine the scope of complex interdependence between the dyad 
members. Ukraine and Georgia are analyzed whether complex interdependence prevails or 
not since the two countries were involved in a war with Russia and the aim is to determine 
whether complex interdependence could have potentially hindered the conflict escalation into 
a war.  
 Moldova 
Moldova’s dependence on Russian economy surpassed the economic dependence 
threshold from 2008 – 2013. Add to that the high levels of energy dependency, the first two 
pillars of complex interdependence are existent. The energy situation for Moldova shows, 
that not only is the country heavily dependent on natural gas imported from Russia, over 90% 
of its electricity produced is also produced from natural gas sources. In 2008, 93,3% of 
electricity produced in Moldova was from natural gas resources and the number was the same 
in 2009, increasing by 0,1% to 93,4%. The relevant number in 2013 was 92,7%75 Moldovan 
government did saw a problem in the high energy dependency from Russia and tried to 
                                                 
75 World Bank, 2015. „Electricity production from natural gas sources (% of total)“ available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.NGAS.ZS (accessed 22.05.2016). 
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diversify their natural gas import portfolio, by constructing a new gas pipeline, connecting 
Moldova with its neighbor country Romania. The pipeline, called Iasi-Ungheni was 
completed in 2014, but remains basically unused until this day. This is due to the fact, that 
50,1% of Moldova’s national gas company called Moldovagaz is owned by Gazprom and 
another 13,4% by Transnistria (de facto Russia).76 This gives Russia legally a complete 
control over the Moldovian domestic gas sector and due to the undermining of Moldovagaz, 
i.e. Russia, Moldova has not been able to import any gas from Romenia. Still, the pipeline is 
now, under the support of the EU lengthened so in 2017 import from the Romanian and EU 
market could start. Moscow has rejected the plan and is threatening to cut gas supplies if 
Moldova continues its implementation of the European Union Third Energy Package. One 
of the conditions under the package is, that the production, transport and distribution cannot 
be done by the same company, something that Gazprom is enjoying at the moment. Russia 
has proposed a deal for Moldova to postpone the package until 2020, otherwise they would 
cut the gas supplies. 
Moldovagaz will probably use every chance it has to undermine domestically and 
internationally the deal and Moldova’s foreign policy goal to join the united EU energy 
market and the EU in general one day, in order to keep Moldova energy dependent from 
Russia. This might prove hard, since Moldova does not enjoy strong economic relations with 
Russia anymore, after Moldova signed the Associations Agreement with the EU, this also 
shows why the economic dependence fell drastically in 2014. The trade and inward FDI-s 
will not resume when Moldova will hold its foreign policy to distance itself economically 
and energetically from Russia and move closer to Brussels. Since it is the governments clear 
policy to decrease energy dependence from Russia and to link Moldova’s economy with the 
EU, Russia, except for its natural gas, does not have many means to influence the government 
from the inside. Public opinion polls show that the population equally supports the EU and 
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the Customs Union with Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan, the numbers being 45% for the EU and 
48% for the CU.77 
A potential interstate militarized dispute between the two nations is almost 
impossible, not only because of the declined economic relations and the low corrupt ties 
between the two nations, but also due to the fact that the two nations do not share a border. 
So geographical distance is somewhat a security guarantee for Moldova. It is clear that 
complex interdependence does not prevail in the dyad of Moldova-Russia due to Moldova’s 
new foreign policy goals. 
Armenia 
Although Armenia in 2014 exceeds the five percent threshold set in this research, it 
is too soon to make any conclusions, since trustworthy data for 2015 is still not available and 
the economic dependence rate of 5,13% could be a one-time thing and not have a greater 
effect on the countries internal, foreign and economic policy. On the other hand, Armenia 
joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 that marks a shift away from the European 
Union and indicates a united economic and foreign policy with Russia. Armenia’s economic 
dependency from Russia has not been that significant in the former years, yet in 2010 an 8% 
decline in Russian GDP caused 15% drop in Armenian GDP shows how intertwined the 
economies were.78 This resulted in a very low dependence from Russia in 2010, declining 
from 3,42% in 2009 to 1,85% in 2010.79 Economic dependence has been rising steadily ever 
since, peaking at the mentioned 5,13% in 2014. One could assume, that after joining the 
Eurasian Economic Union, economic dependence from Russia will increase. Another 
important issue is Armenia’s energy dependence from Russian energy carriers. Russia 
                                                 
77 Institute for Public Policy, 2015. “Final Report, BPO – November 2015” available at: 
http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_11.2015_first_part_ENGLISH_V1.pdf (accessed 
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79 Source: Authors own calculations. Dependence as % of GDP (Foreign trade + Inward FDI), formula 
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acquired in the course of 2000s several key energy infrastructure units like Metsamor nuclear 
power plant and acquired stakes in the Armenian natural gas infrastructure system. Russia 
then went on to undermine the Tabris-Yershak gas pipeline construction with between 
Armenia and Iran. A deal that would have decreased Armenia’s energy dependency from 
Russia and allowing Armenia to diversify its energy imports. Russia answered by doubling 
the natural gas prices for Armenia from 54 US dollars in 2005 to 110 US dollars per 1000 
cubic meters from 2006 – 2009. The rapidly increasing gas prices affected all of Armenia 
and the consumers could not afford the pay the newly set price. This was also seen as a 
punishment action from Moscow to warn the Armenian government about the consequences 
of trying to leave Russian sphere of economic and political dependence. A move that had 
been used to punish Ukraine and Georgia after their Color Revolutions and aligning with the 
policies of the West, i.e. the European Union, the United States and NATO. Such moves 
were seen by Moscow as hostile. Potential revolutions in the future with possible receding 
from Russian economy and energy dependence, had to be stopped. After facing years of 
unpopularity and the dissatiscafction from the Armenian consumers, president Robert 
Kocharyan gave in to Moscow and Gazprom not only acquired the first part of the Armenian-
Iran gas pipeline in Armenian territory, allowing Gazprom, i.e. Moscow to control the flow 
of natural gas Armenia receives from Iran. Gazprom also managed to acquire 82%-92% of 
Armenia’s national gas company ArmRosGas.80 This shows relatively high level of 
economic and energy dependence from Russia that form the first pillars of complex 
interdependence. Yet, looking at plain economic statistics, economic dependence could not 
be marked as significant in most of the studied years.  
Corruption, both political and business corruption is also high in Armenia. These 
sectors are also connected with Russia and depend on Russian orders and political decisions. 
Personal connections between politicians and business men in Armenia and between 
Moscow and Yerevan have created a highly monopolized economy divided between local, 
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foreign and Russian business men and companies. Different Russian state owned and private 
multinational corporations own large shares of the countries mining, telecommunications and 
most importantly, energy sector. Also a lot of Armenians are dependent on their relatives 
working in Russia and sending remittances back to home. But due to the worsening economic 
climate in Russia, a lot of Armenians have lost their job in Russia, forcing the government to 
seek new economic and business relations with the West once again.81 ArmeniaNow made 
an analysis about the economic sector and the political and business ties in 2008. According 
to the analysis and information provided by the former Prime Minister Hrant Bagratian, 
around 55% of Armenia’s GDP is controlled by only 44 oligarch families. At least 25 of the 
131 total parliament members were business men, creating a very favorable opportunity to 
control the business sector through official state policies.82 
The heavy corruption in the political and economic sphere, combined with the 
politicians, who own and control over half of the economy, and the relations with Russia, 
show how complex interdependence does exist in the Armenia-Russia dyad. What also 
contributes to the high level of political and economic corruption is the lack of democracy 
and an semi authoritarian government that has to protect its interests by maintain good 
relations with Moscow and the business elite. The lack of political opposition and free and 
fair elections has created a situation where change is hard to occur. It is too soon to make any 
future projections, since Armenia is already looking for new markets and trading options 
with the West and it seems the decision by joining the EEU in 2015, is already regretted. 
Moscow’s next moves could again be energy related trying to tighten its political and 
economic grip on Armenia. When the overall economic climate worsens and the majority of 
the population is going to be unsatisfied for a longer period of time with the government’s 
official policy. 
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When looking at the CaucasusBarometer statistics, only 19% of voters trusted the 
president and its institution, compared to the 59% of voters who fully distrusted or somewhat 
distrusted the president and its institution. The support for Armenia’s membership to the EU 
was 45% compared to the 26% who did not support membership to the EU. Membership to 
the EEU was supported by 55% of voters, the membership was rejected by just 13%.83 The 
respective numbers in 2015 were almost the same. But the distrust for president’s institution 
had declined to 63% and trust had declined to 16%. On the other hand, support for Armenia’s 
membership to the EU had also declined to 39%, and the number of voters who declined 
Armenia’s membership to the EU had also declined to 22%. Membership support for the 
EEU was 55% compared to the 12% who did not support the membership to the EEU.84 
The statistics are somewhat controversial. Although the majority of the voters distrust 
the president’s regime, the support for EEU membership is higher than the support for EU 
membership. It is hard to make any long term projections what might happen. Dissatisfaction 
and the declined support for the ruling regime is what sparked the Euromaidan events in 
Ukraine back in 2013. This was backed by the support for the membership to the EU and the 
anti-support attitude towards the new economic deal with Moscow. Such a future might be 
possible in Armenia, since the dissatisfaction with the president’s institution is very high, on 
the other hand the public seems to support Armenia’s belonging to the EEU. It would be the 
authors conclusion, that when the support for the EU increases in a correlation with the 
decrease in support for the EEU (i.e. basically towards a Russian favored foreign policy), and 
given the fact that the dissatisfaction and distrust with the president’s regime remain high, 
events like Euromaidan might be possible. 
Ukraine 
Ukraine’s economic dependence from Russia has been high since the early two 
thousands. This is due to the very strong historic economic ties between Russia and Ukraine. 
Ukraine inherited approximately a third of the Soviet Union’s heavy war industry and is 
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highly dependent on Russian orders, state owned companies like Ukroboronprom, which 
unites one hundred and twenty five domestic defense companies mostly rely on Russian 
orders (for instance Antonov aircrafts, Mi helicopter engines, ammunitions, guided missiles, 
ammunition etc.) and their profit goes directly into the federal budget. Russia has been the 
biggest single market for Ukraine in both import and export-wise from the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union back in 1991 until 2013, which marked the last year when Russia was the single 
biggest trading partner for Ukraine85. Still, heavy industries like the war industry, metallurgy 
industry and the coal industry, but also the agriculture industry remained heavily dependent 
on Russia’s import. So due to the historic reasons, the economies of Ukraine and Russia have 
always been strongly linked in the described sectors which carried remarkable losses after 
the conflict between Russia and Ukraine escalated in the end of 2013.  
When looking at Table 3, the data shows how from the end of the global financial 
crisis Ukraine’s dependency from Russia rose almost up to 13% in 2012 and then began to 
fall. Before the conflict escalation, the dependency percentage was 9,01 for Ukraine. This 
number indicates a relatively high number of dependence, in fiscal terms it means 16,51mln 
US dollars from the total GDP of 183,31mln US dollars.  
 
Table 3. Dependence as % of GDP (Foreign trade + Inward FDI). Ukraine. Source: Authors own calculations. 
Formula by Russet, O’Neal, Davis, 1998. Original data originating from the World Bank, Russian Federal 
Federation Federal State Statistics Service, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, United Nations Database. 
Statistics show that the dependence from Russian money in Ukraine is relatively high, 
but the dependence started to decrease from its peak of 12,95% in 2011 and had fallen to 
9,01% in 2013, the year the conflict between Ukraine and Russia escalated. According to the 
liberals, such an escalation should not have happened. But there is more to it than just 
economic dependency. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia started to unravel back in 
the end of 2013 and was sparked due to the disappointment about the decision to reject the 
                                                 
85 European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2015. “Ukraine Trade Profile” available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf (accessed 10.05.2016). 
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2005 2000
Ukraine 7,91 9,01 10,70 12,95 10,82 8,49 9,35 11,92
Dependence, as a % of GDP (Foreign Trade + Inward FDI)
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European Union Association Agreement at the EU Vilnius summit. The president at the time, 
Viktor Yanukovych was supported financially and politically by the Putin led Russian 
government. The political support from Russia, coupled with promises about financial aid 
from Moscow and president Yanukovych’s strong personal ties with president Putin, made 
it very hard for Yanukovych to accept the EU offered agreement. Russia had warned Ukraine 
with different economic sanctions during 2013 not to accept the EU-s offer. For instance, in 
July 2013 Russia’s consumer rights watchdog, Rospotrebnadzor banned the import of 
Ukrainian made chocolate products made by Roshen, a company owned by pro-European 
politician (former minister of foreign affairs and of trade) and businessman Petro 
Poroshenko. The move was seen as a punishment and warning for Ukraine by their Russian 
counterparts for the deepening economic and political relations with the EU. Facing political 
and financial pressure from Moscow, president Yanukovych declined the EU offered deal, 
stating the offered financial aid of 610 million Euros (intended as a loan) offered by the EU 
to Kiev is inadequate and that demanded political changes are not reasonable.86 The political 
games played by president Yanukovych seemed to favor the Russian bound oligarchs and 
business sector, since right after the rejected EU deal, president Yanukovych met with his 
Russian counterpart and on the 17th December 2013, the Ukrainian-Russian action plan was 
signed, granting 15 billion dollars to the Ukrainian government in loans and a new, fixed and 
lowered gas price. 87 But the latter deal between Ukraine and Russia did not save 
Yanukovych’s political career. In order to understand, why the rejection of the EU deal did 
spark the Euromaidan events that eventually pinnacled with a second revolution within ten 
years, it is important to look at the whole situation through the complex interdependence 
theory. 
It is also very important to notice that Ukraine is also highly dependent on Russian 
energy carriers, especially from Russian oil products and natural gas. Russia is the main 
importer of natural gas to Ukraine. In 2013, Ukraine imported 25,8bln cubic meters natural 
                                                 
86 BBC, 2013. “Ukraine protests after Yanukovych EU deal rejection” available at: 
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gas from Russia (92% of all the natural gas imported), which is nevertheless 15,1% less than 
in 2012. In 2014 Ukraine managed to reduce its import of natural gas from Russia even more 
to 14,5bln cubic meters, an import downfall of 1,8 times. This was possible due to the 
increased import of natural gas from the EU what rose 2,4 times to 5bln cubic meters in 2014, 
compared to 2,1bln cubic meters in 2013. Equally important is the energy consumption by 
sector in Ukraine. In 2012, the industrial sector used 33,98% of the produced energy and the 
residential and household sector 32,10%, transportation was the third biggest energy 
consumer with 15,66% of the produced energy.88 The latter statistics shows how dependent 
and vulnerable Ukraine is from Russia and Russia has over the years effectively used energy 
carriers as means of influence. Russia is dictating the price of gas and since the industrial 
sector is using a third of the produced energy it is highly dependent on Russian natural gas 
and will influence the government not choose a favorable foreign policy, in order to maintain 
the sustainable energy flows with a price lower than on the market. Since the industrial sector 
is run by oligarchs standing close to the government, corruption will prevail and this will 
create a situation, where all the parties need each other in order for the system not to fail. The 
same logic also applies for the residential and household sector. The government is dependent 
on its electorate and when gas flows are cut, the citizens will literally be left in the cold. This 
again reflects on the support of the government. So Russia has, via. energy carriers influenced 
Ukrainian foreign policy towards Kremlin by making them dependent on both energy, trade 
and FDI-s. The 2005 and 2008/9 gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia showed exactly 
how vulnerable Ukraine is and that settling the disputes is a high-stakes political game that 
involves potential corruption and oligarchs. One must not also exclude the rest of Europe – 
in both cases of 2005 and 2008/9, gas flows did not only stop for Ukraine, they also stopped 
for the rest of Europe who is more or less dependent on Russian gas. For Moscow, the plan 
all along was to subject Ukraine in order to “become a single transit space between Europe 
and China, between European and Asian markets,” as explained by the chairman of the 
                                                 
88 Inna Semenenko, Institute of Economic Research and Polish Economic Society Branch in Toruń, 
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International Affairs Committee of the State Duma, Konstantin Kosachyev.89 This would 
have given Moscow even more power not only over Ukraine, but also against the EU. 
Moscow continued to pressure Kiev in acquiring 50% of its national gas company, Naftogas, 
but Kiev did not sell its shares like did Belarus in 2007. Moscow took the negative step again 
as threat what escalated with the 2008/9 gas dispute. So not only is Kiev facing political 
pressure from inside its own country, but also external pressure both from Moscow and the 
capitals of Europe.  
As described in the theoretical base section, complex interdependence consists of 
three main pillars – multiple channels, absence of hierarchy and the absence of military force 
when complex interdependence prevails. Now it is established, that dependency in several 
key economic areas did prevail and forced the president to align its foreign policy with the 
one of Moscow, not Brussels. The other three variables used on the current research are 
corruption, public opinion and the level of democracy represent the other pillars of complex 
interdependence. As explained in the research design chapter, corruption can not only 
encompass the political institutions and the ruling government, but can also incorporate the 
business sector with the political sector and intertwine the two. In the Ukrainian case, levels 
of corruption were very high and the political elite was dependent on the business elite and 
vice versa. The ties are also present and extend over the borders – the oligarchs in the Eastern-
Ukraine were financially and economically very much interweaved with the Russian 
economy and they depended on the Russian market. The oligarchs also relied on personal 
ties with the Russian political and business elites so it created a triadic nexus between the 
Russian business/political elite, the Ukrainian business elites and the Ukrainian political 
elites. They all depended on each other in different ways and the triadic system fostered 
corruption and it was crucial for the system that all the parties would remain relatively intact 
from democratic control mechanisms (for instance democratic elections that could change 
the working system). The proposed triadic nexus was present within the energy sector that 
was described before and linked Kremlin with Kiev and Ukrainian oligarchs. Just as Smith 
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described about the ties of politics and the business sector: “Yanukovych had constructed a 
powerful local political machine in the Donbas region, an eastern region known for its 
corruption and use of state resources for regional gain.”90 “Yanukovych represented the 
strongest clan of the oligarchs in Donetsk and that he received support from three groups of 
oligarchs in Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kiev, making him the best possible candidate for 
the government that was mostly comprised of oligarchs and policies that benefited their 
interests.”91 Yanukovych rose to presidency in 2010, after the opposition was split and the 
electorate wanted change in the economic policies. He then started consolidating his power 
by “overturning the constitutional changes that were made after the Orange Revolution. 
Yanukovych used his new powers to replace all government officials with those who were 
loyal to him, giving his political party full control.”92 Angela Stent described, that Russia still 
viewed Ukraine not as a partner on equal terms, but as a former member of the Soviet Union 
that now, with the rest of the former members were part of Russia’s sphere of influence. The 
sphere granted Russia special privileges and rights, but it also meant Russia maintained close 
business and political relations with Kiev, in order to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence 
by keeping close relations with the country’s political and business elites, i.e. with oligarchs. 
Stent points out, that another crucial factor was maintain influence through “linguistic, 
educational, and cultural ties.”93 After Russia declined the Association Agreement with the 
EU, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the foreign minister of Germany accused Russia in its 
inauguration speech, stating that: “It is scandalous how Russia used Ukraine's economic 
plight in order to prevent the signing of the association agreement with the European 
Union.”94 This all shows that the described triadic nexus of corruption indeed existed, 
Yanukovych and the political elite depended on money flowing in from Moscow. Moscow 
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on the other hand saw the semi-authoritarian regime as close ally over whom Putin can extend 
its political power and influence. Maintaining the status-quo in Ukraine would give Moscow 
and the Putin’s regime the opportunity to not only control the local political and business 
elite, but it would give Moscow the chance to control the gas flows into Europe and maintain 
a military upper-hand in the Black Sea by maintaining its naval base in Sevastopol. 
Maintaining its security in the region was one of Kremlin’s main concerns.  The theoretical 
and empirical evidence provided here is also backed by the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), as seen in Table 4. 
Table 4. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Source: Transparency International, 
Corruption Perception Index Database. 
It is clear from the CPI data, that corruption has been a big problem in Ukraine within the 
last decades and the events in the end of 2013, when Yanukovych neglected the proposed 
EU deal were seen as the continuance of the ruling regimes corrupt policies and sparked the 
Euromaidan events. The described gas disputes were only one of Kremlin’s levers to 
influence Kiev. Putin and Medvedev’s regime also undermined Ukraine’s attempts to gain a 
NATO Membership Action Plan back in 2008 in order to protect its influence and power in 
the region. President Yushcenko’s EU and NATO oriented foreign policy and receding from 
Russia and its sphere of influence challenged Moscow to take somewhat drastic measures for 
retaining its position in the region.  
 As described in the latter sections, corruption and economic dependency were heavily 
linked in Ukraine during the past decades. This, just like inter-state corruption tied with 
personal relations of politicians and oligarchs, fits in the model of complex interdependence. 
Public opinion in the Ukrainian case is closely linked with corruption. Researchers like 
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2005 2000
Ukraine 26,00 25,00 26,00 2,30 2,40 2,20 2,60 1,50
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
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Allison Smith95, Dmitry Gorenburg96, Aleksei Poltorakov97, Aleksei Shestakovskii98 and Ilya 
Gerasimov99 have all stated that one of the key reasons behind the Euromaidan events was 
corruption. And not only political corruption, but the already described corruption within the 
political and business sector, since the two are intertwined in Ukraine. But it is vital to explain 
how the Ukrainian society had differentiated into two major value based societal units. 
Shestakovskii explained in his study about Euromaidan values that Ukraine as an entity was 
split in half – west vs. east, western values vs. eastern/Russian values, capitalist vs. socialist 
values, secular vs. orthodox values. Kiev as the capital was leaning more towards west and 
the younger generation in Kiev felt disappointed and saw Yanukovych’s decision to reject 
the EU deal as degrading for Ukraine and again falling more under Moscow’s control. The 
values portrayed by the Euromaidan protestors were more in common with the conservative 
Scandinavian and Wester-Europe values than with the ones originating from Russia. The 
protestors valued the common good and a high moral standards more than individual gain 
(that is a common factor in corruption) and were willing to risk for the values.100 Ilya 
Gerasimov found in his study about Euromaidan, that indeed a clash of traditional and 
western values sparked the conflict. “The Ukrainian revolution is a postcolonial revolution 
because it is all about the people acquiring their own voice, and in the process of this self-
assertive act forging a new Ukrainian nation as a community of negotiated solidary action by 
self-conscious individuals.”101 This is explained by Gerasimov by referring to an essay by 
Yaroslav Hrytsak: “The distinction between identity-centered and value-oriented 
approaches. Many experts in the region and left-leaning intellectuals prefer to support 
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Russian aggression against Ukraine because in this way they can keep unchanged their 
worldview structured by taxonomies of fixed identities: “Russia as a main antifascist force,” 
“Ukrainian fascists,” “American imperialists,” and so on. A critical deconstruction of 
familiar clichés implies that one has to enter uncharted waters and embrace a new, unfamiliar 
reality of post-postmodern society and postcolonial revolution.”102 Again, a pattern of a clash 
of values within the Ukrainian society emerges that paved the way from Euromaidan to the 
revolution. The old vs. new values within the society marked the postcolonial revolution, as 
described by Gerasimov. It shows, that the values represented by the governing regime did 
not match the expectations of the younger, western oriented generation and since the political 
regime was also highly corrupt, the pivot towards Moscow was seen as a stagnation for 
Ukraine. Alexander Vinogradov conducted a psychological case study and  presents the same 
results about the values of Euromaidan. Vinogradov uses the Schwartz Value Theory to 
measure the values of Euromaidan protestors and to determine what are the motivators of 
their actions and what are the potential end-goals. Vinogradov determined, that the values 
represented by the Euromaidan protesters were mainly the in line with the Western-European 
and Scandinavian values. Benevolence, universalism, self-direction and security prevailed 
over values like power, tradition, conformity heroism and achievement. The rest of the 
Ukraine did value conformity, tradition, power and did not value the universal moral values 
as much as the Euromaidan part of the society. Schwartz Value Theory also determines, that 
the values represented within the Euromaidan generation, did spark the need for protest, the 
need for a change and the need to change the moral values in the society. “After the first 
week and after the brutal beating of students, the Revolution of Dignity began. It was 
followed with the expression of negative attitudes towards government, police, and 
personally Yanukovych and Azarov together with the manifestation of the values of equality, 
fairness, security, human rights, and respect for dignity.”103 The presented studies and 
explanations about the clash of values that sparked the revolution also coincide with the 
public opinion polls in Ukraine, as seen in Table 5.  
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         Public opinion, European Union versus Russia 
Year EU Russia 
2014 52,50 16,60 
2013 n/a n/a 
2012 38,75 33,15 
2011 36,95 37,85 
2010 26,50 46,30 
2009 25,70 50,55 
2005 34,56 38,93 
2002 29,63 29,90 
 
 
Table 5. Public opinion, 
European Union versus 
Russa. 
Source: Authors own 
calculations. Original 
data originating from 
Razumkov Centre. 
 
The public opinion polls conducted yearly by the Razumkov Centre in Kyiv, confirm the 
studies presented and analyzed in this research. From the public opinion polls, again the 
described pattern emerges, where a nation is divided largely into two. In the early 2000s, the 
difference between the west vs. east values was not that big, but peaked in 2009, when Russia 
used its second gas dispute to split the local political opposition and undermined the positions 
of president Yushchenko. Such tactics helped Moscow to support once again the candidacy 
of Viktor Yanukovych and tighten the political and economic “noose” around Ukraine’s 
neck. But the deepening corruption within the political and business elite combined with the 
bad economic results, paved way to ideas, that Moscow and president Yanukovych had 
reversed the positive effects of democracy and the 2005 Orange revolution. The support for 
Russian biased policy declined fast and already in 2011, the two sides of one country were 
on even terms, in 2012, the Western values already prevailed and the majority of Ukrainian 
citizens wanted to see a chance of foreign policy from Russia towards Brussels. The pro-
Russian values and the deepening corruption were seen as one of the indicators the public 
opinion towards Russia changed and the Western Values and the EU was seen as a viable 
new course for Ukraine. As Olga Chupyra is referred by Gorenburg in his editors overview: 
“The resulting mixing of people with different cultural backgrounds in a highly fraught 
environment may have helped to bridge the cultural gap that has dominated Ukrainian politics 
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since independence, strengthening civic Ukrainian national identity in the process.”104 The 
described situation of corruption, economic dependence and the governing regime of 
Yanukovych can be described with the words of Tellis: “In other words, corruption by the 
insiders of the regime is the Achilles’ heel of an authoritarian developmental state.”105 But in 
the Ukrainian case, corruption marked only one pillar of the many that lead up to the events 
of Euromaidan.  
 It is clear how corruption is closely intertwined and linked with economic dependency 
and how the two variables very much influenced the public opinion in Ukraine, but the third 
control variable used in the study, regime type is also closely linked with the latter two pillars 
of complex interdependence.  
Table 6. Democracy Index and Regime Type. Source: Economist Intelligent Unit Index of Democracy.  
The regime types in Russia and Ukraine have been relatively alike. When Ukraine was until 
2010 marked as a flawed democracy, the regime change from Yushchenko to Yanukovych 
with the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko in 2011 marked the regime type change in 
Ukraine towards a hybrid regime that can also be described as a semi-authoritarian regime. 
When looking at the empirical data presented and the studies analyzed, one can conclude, 
that regime change and aligning more with Moscow increased the dependency from Russia 
for a couple of years and also the support towards a Russian friendly foreign policy increased. 
But as explained, the stagnation in economy with the increased corruption, turning away from 
the EU and aligning with Russia all created the perfect conditions for Euromaidan that 
escalated into a revolution.  
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Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2008 2006 2000
Ukraine 5,42 5,84 5,91 5,94 6,30 6,94 6,94 n/a
Regime Type
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Flawed 
Democracy
Flawed 
Democracy
Flawed 
Democracy n/a
Democracy Intex
  
61 
 
Although in the Russo-Ukrainian case the similar regimes contributed to the complex 
interdependence model, since not only were the two regimes similar, but they were also 
connected via. personal/formal, as well as impersonal/informal ties. This applies both to the 
political and economic sector and the triadic nexus model can also be applied to the elite’s 
relations between Kiev and Moscow. So it seems that the complex interdependence model 
can be applied to the Russo-Ukrainian relations. As explained, there were formal and 
informal ties between the government officials, political elite and the business sector. 
Military security was not always the top priority of interstate relations. Russia did feel it is 
losing its economic and military influence in the region and did undermine the Ukrainian 
MAP from NATO, but at the same time there was a constant battle over the prices of energy 
carriers and the heavy industry sector wanted to secure orders from Russia and retain the 
cheap gas originating from Russia. Corruption also tied the two countries together and did 
that from the highest level, in both political and business spheres. The regime type statistics 
shows how the two governmental systems were similar and this should have avoided a 
possibility of a militarized conflict, as suggested by Benoit106 and Gleditsch and Hegre.107 
But Gleditsch and Hegre also imply, that the process of democratization, that started in 
Ukraine with the events of Euromaidan might be the cause of a conflict. This might also be 
the case with Russia and Ukraine. Although the complex interdependent model did exist 
between the dyad, the key variable was the public opinion. A dramatic change in the public 
perception that could even described as a change in the collective paradigm. The shift in the 
collective consciousness made people come to the streets and sparked the demonstrations. 
Yanukovych did not reply, aligned with Moscow, who feared of losing its influence in the 
region and eventually Yanukovych sent its own troops against its own people. This was the 
last straw so to speak. The public wanted a change towards the West and also valued the 
Western values as well, so a democratization process was about to happen in Ukraine that 
again frightened Moscow and eventually put them in a position to undermine the newly 
                                                 
106 Kenneth Benoit, „Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General). Reexamining Regime Type 
and War Involvement,“ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1996, (40), pp. 636-657. 
107 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Havard Hegre, „Peace and Democracy, Three Levels of Analysis,“ Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 1997, (41), pp. 283-310. 
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appointed government and to spark a civil war in Ukraine, while being a silent supporter of 
the pro-Russian regimes in Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk.  
The question, whether there is a militarized interstate conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine that can be considered as an act of war in the current research, it is necessary to look 
at the scale of the conflict and the chronology of public statements and actions made by the 
political leaders of Ukraine and Russia. The scale of the conflict can be described as 
extensive. Unmarked Russian troops invaded Crimea in February 2014 and illegaly seized 
power from the local authorities in Simferopol. Also in February, president Putin asked the 
Federal Assembly “to authorize the use of force not just in Crimea, but "on Ukraine's territory 
until the socio-political situation is normalized."”108 A referendum was held in March, where 
97% of locals have said to voted to join Russia. A step that Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenuk 
described as not as a threat, but an act of war against Ukraine.109 The first battles in the 
Donbass region broke out in April 2014. But already in March, Ukraine mobilized its troops 
and called up military reservists in order to battle the separatist republics, whom Russia 
continues to support until this day with financial, military and technical aid. In March 2015, 
Yatsenuk stated that ““Ukraine is in a state of war with a nuclear state, which is the Russian 
Federation. Hostile countries over the past decade have spent billions of dollars rearming 
it.””110 In June, 2015, president Poroshenko singed the Bill No 389-VIII On Legal Regime 
of Martial Law.111 The latter legal document gave the Ukrainian head of state the power to 
declare war. Although neither parties have actually declared the state of war, the Ukrainian 
side has mobilized its troops and moved its heavy weaponry to the civil war border. This all 
indicates a large scale use of military force in the Ukrainian side. Russia has officially denied 
                                                 
108 Julia Ioffe, New Republic, 2014. „Putin's War in Crimea Could Soon Spread to Eastern Ukraine“ 
available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/116810/putin-declares-war-ukraine-and-us-or-nato-wont-do-
much (accessed 11.05.2016).  
109 Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Ben Wedeman, Ian Lee, CNN, 2014. “Ukraine mobilizes troops after 
Russia's 'declaration of war” available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-politics/ 
(accessed 11.05.2016). 
110 Eric Zeusse, RINF, 2015. „Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yatsenyuk Declares War On Russia“ available 
at: http://rinf.com/alt-news/editorials/ukraines-prime-minister-yatsenyuk-declares-war-on-russia/ (accessed 
11.05.2016). 
111 Glavnoe 2015. “Poroshenko signed a law on the legal aspects of the martial law” available at: 
http://en.glavnoe.ua/news/n229241 (accessed: 11.05.2016) 
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any involvement in the war in Donbass, but it has become an open secret within the Western 
societies and political leaders, that Russia is involved, is supporting the separatist regions 
with armed forces, heavy weaponry, financial means and with overall coordination from 
Moscow. When looking at the conflict from the perspective of international law, the conflict 
cannot be considered as a war between two states. It can be classified as militarized interstate 
dispute, since no party has declared war and in legal terms Russia is not involved in the crisis. 
But when considering all the events related with the conflict, the scale of the conflict itself, 
the different parties of the conflict, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is considered as an act of 
war in the current research. Such an analysis also supported by the Swedish Defense Research 
Agency, what has mapped the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and carried out a legal analysis based 
on international war by looking at all the different actions and variables involved in the crisis. 
“Given the reports on Russian involvement in Ukraine, however, it may be more likely that 
the ongoing armed conflict on Ukrainian territory amounts to an international armed conflict 
as defined in common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, which holds that an armed 
conflict may arise between two or more of the high contracting parties (which today means 
states).”112 However, the SWDA does admit, that Russia’s hidden involvement may not give 
enough legal ground to define the conflict as an international one, all the evidence point that 
the legal and political framework in the international community should state “it as it is in 
Ukraine, namely war.”113 
So although complex interdependence did prevail in the dyad between Russia and 
Ukraine, factors like corruption, intertwined personal relations with Russia and economic 
dependence rather evoked the chances of a conflict, since they made to change the public 
discourse. Peace should have prevailed over conflict, since the potential economic and 
political gains for the country, as an abstract unit were far greater than the outcomes of the 
ongoing crisis, but the psychological effect of the Euromaidan and the changed values in the 
societies did not take into account the rational arguments of potential gains and losses, since 
                                                 
112 Carina Lamont, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2014.„What is War? Ukraine and the Legal 
Definition of War“ available at: 
http://www.foi.se/Documents/RUFS%20Briefing%20Carina%20Lamont%20.pdf (accessed: 11.05.2016). 
113 Ibid. 
  
64 
 
the collective mind had already decided that the current political order has to be changed and 
from one moment on the only possible way was a revolution that escalated with a civil 
war/war with Russia. The escalation of once peaceful protests into an international 
militarized conflict, i.e. war, indicates that the assumption about interdependence and peace 
in the context of Ukraine does not apply.  
Georgia 
Georgian economic dependence from Russia has never been in as high that it could 
be marked as significant. Table 7 shows Georgia’s economic dependence from Russia from 
2000 – 2014.  
Table 7. Dependence as % of GDP (Foreign trade + Inward FDI). Georgia. Source: Authors own calculations. 
Formula by Russet, O’Neal, Davis, 1998. Original data originating from the World Bank, Russian Federal 
Federation Federal State Statistics Service, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, United Nations Database. 
The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 cut the economic and financial ties between the two 
countries and the inward FDI-s from Russia stopped, along with foreign trade with Russia 
almost to a complete zero in 2009. The calculated dependency from Russia was just 0,24% 
for Georgia in 2009, but has steadily risen up to 2,26% in 2014. But even before the Russo-
Georgian war in 2008, Georgia’s dependency from Russian economy was never over the 5% 
threshold. So the Georgian case should not be viewed in this research, but the lack of 
economic interdependence and a clear presence of war back in 2008, might indicate that the 
realist assumptions that interdependence either increases the likelihood of war or is not 
related to the causes of war, about interdependence and peace have at least in one aspect 
failed in Georgia. The liberal argument that interdependence decreases the likelihood of 
conflict might seem to hold in the case of Georgia. But in order to confirm or disconfirm the 
assumption, the Russo-Ukrainian dyad is needed to be looked in the complex 
interdependence model also used for Ukraine.  
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2005 2000
Georgia 2,26 1,42 0,68 0,69 0,73 0,24 3,13 2,67
Dependence, as a % of GDP (Foreign Trade + Inward FDI)
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 Coming back to the economic dependency from Russia, the presented statistics 
clearly indicate how Georgia’s economy was not dependent from Russia. In 2009, Georgia’s 
GDP was 10,77mln US dollars and the dependence of just 0,24% in 2009, equals just 
0,026mln  dollars originating directly from Russia via FDI-s and through foreign trade with 
Russia. In 2014, Georgia’s GDP had risen to 16,53mln US dollars and the 2,26% dependence 
ration equals to a not very remarkable 0,37mln US dollars originating directly from Russia 
via FDI-s and through foreign trade with Russia. Again, the dependence is not remarkable 
and cannot be considered as economic dependence at all. But, just like it was the case with 
Ukraine, Georgia was also highly dependent on Russian energy carriers, especially Russian 
gas. Table 8 presents Ukrainian dependency from Russian natural gas between 2003 and 
2014 (older data was not available).  
Georgia's natural gas consumption and import from Russia 
Year 
Georgia's 
natural gas 
consumption 
(cubic meters) 
Georiga's natural 
gas imports from 
Russia (as a % of 
total consumption) 
2014 2177036,00 2,80 
2013 1912530,00 0,00 
2012 1916199,00 1,60 
2011 1782729,00 1,70 
2010 1121140,00 3,90 
2009 1188822,00 9,80 
2008 1471218,00 34,00 
2007 1700020,00 57,00 
2005 1331575,00 87,00 
2003 878791,00 86,00 
 
 
 
Table 8. 
Georgia’s 
natural gas 
consumption 
and important 
from Russia (as 
a % of total 
consumption). 
Source: Authors 
own 
calculations. 
Original data 
originating from 
Civil Georgia. 
According to an energy report by Georgia, conducted by the Energy Efficiency Centre 
Georgia, a pattern emerges that in some sectors resembles Ukraine, 31% of the energy 
produced in Georgia (as of 2012) is produced from natural gas and the primary energy 
consumers (in 2012) were the residential (36%), transportation (29%) and industrial sector 
(22%). Tbilisi, the capital is getting 43% of its primary energy from natural gas and all of it 
is imported. The rural regions and other cities do not depend as much from natural gas and 
the electricity originating from natural gas. According to the report, the energy production 
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and consumption did decline up until the early 2000s, when it started to increase again, but 
the report implies that the estimations about energy production from basic energy carriers 
and energy consumption by sectors has remained the same in time. 114 So it is safe to assume, 
that the values given about consumption and production were also relevant in 2008, at the 
time of the Russo-Georgian war. Georgia’s energy dependency from Russia. What increased 
Georgia’s dependency from Russian gas even more, was the fact that Gazprom acquired the 
Georgian gas main in 2005 for a restructuring of Georgia’s national debt in front of Russia. 
Although the natural gas prices went up for Georgia from 2006 FY from previous 64 US 
dollars to 110 US dollars, it was still considered as a win, since Gazprom, as the sole exporter 
of natural gas into Georgia at that time threatened to increase the price up to 200 US dollars 
(per thousand cubic meters). The events that followed put even more pressure on Georgia, 
since in 2006, the only pipeline carrying natural gas to Georgia was sabotaged on the Russian 
side. No proof or evidence about the organizes were found, but Georgia’s high ranking 
politicians, like the president Saakashvili referred on "dark, barbaric forces," implying 
sabotaging by Gazprom.115 At the end of 2006, Gazprom announced it would increase the 
natural gas prices for Georgia from the settled 110 US dollars to 230 US dollars for 2007 (per 
thousand cubic meters). Gazprom also offered it would lower the price “in exchange for a 
stake in the Georgian energy sector.”116 Georgian officials eventually declined the offer and 
accepted the higher gas prices for FY 2007.  
 Georgia could reject the energy dependency pressure originating from Gazprom and 
Russia by averting its natural gas imports and to reverse its energy dependency from Russia 
and Gazprom. This was possible since Georgia was a “transit state for a pipeline completed 
in mid-2006, carrying one million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of 
Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC pipeline). Another pipeline completed in early 
2007 initially carries 2.2 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani natural gas to Georgia and 
                                                 
114 Elena Gvilava, Liana Garibashvili, Energy Efficiency Centre Georgia, 2014. „Reinforcing 
Cooperation With ENP Countries On Bridging The Gap Between Energy Research And Energy Innovation“ 
available at: https://ener2i.eu/page/34/attach/0_Georgia_Country_Report.pdf (accessed 12.05.2016). 
115 Radio Free Liberty Radio Europe, 2006. “Newsline” available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143562.html (accessed 12.05.2016). 
116 Beryl Nygren, „Putins Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region,“ Problems of Post-
Communism, 2008, (55), pp. 3-15. 
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Turkey, lessening their dependence on Russia as a supplier. Another pipeline carries oil from 
Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa.”117 The presented evidence about Georgia’s economic 
dependence and energy dependence all suggest that Georgia was not dependent on Russia 
neither economically nor energetically when the Russo-Georgian war broke out in 2008. 
Such economic levers to control Georgia externally and internally to change its foreign policy 
towards Russia did not exist for Moscow. The two political regimes were not as intertwined 
with each other as was the case with Ukraine. The same applies to the business sector as well. 
Georgia did not have a very strong and politically influential group of oligarchs in the society 
who were in turn dependent on Moscow and lobbied the central government for more 
favorable deals with Russia.  
 The absence of such a pillar from the complex interdependent theory could also not 
foster corruption that was always present in Ukraine, when describing the dyadic relation of 
Ukraine and Russia, i.e. the personal ties of political and business leaders. As described with 
the Ukrainian case, such ties did only foster Ukraine and eventually brought people to the 
streets. It is wrong to say there was no corruption in Georgia, since according to the 
Corruption Perception Index Georgia was in some sectors as corrupt as Ukraine, but due to 
the lack of political and economic relations between Thblisi and Moscow, corruption was 
never a part of foreign policy, as was the case with Ukraine. Table 9 indicates the corruption 
index in Georgia.  
Table 9. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Source: Transparency International, 
Corruption Perception Index Database. 
The triadic nexus of corruption does not apply in the case of Georgia for the already described 
reasons – the lack of personal political ties between Georgia and Russia, just like the lack of 
personal business ties between Georgia and Russia with the lack of a strong oligarchic group 
                                                 
117 Steven Woehrel, Congressional Research Service, 2010. „Russian Energy Policy Towards 
Neighboring Countries“ available at:  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235213404_Russian_Energy_Policy_Toward_Neighboring_Countri
es (accessed 12.05.2016). 
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2005 2000
Georgia 52,00 49,00 52,00 4,10 3,80 4,10 2,30 n/a
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
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within the society who also has strong personal relations with both Thblisi and Moscow did 
not allow Moscow to control and direct Thblisi’s foreign policy away from the EU and 
NATO. So the complex interdependence model also used to describe the dyadic relationship 
between Ukraine and Russia and to show how some of the sectors of each country have 
heavily intertwined and can be described as complex interdependence. In the case of Georgia, 
its relationship with Russia cannot be described with the first pillar of complex 
interdependence ‘multiple formal and informal ties between government officials, 
nongovernmental elites and transnational organizations.’  
  The second variable, that turned out to be very significant in the Ukrainian case, was 
public opinion. In order to assess, if public opinion played the same role in the Georgian 
society as it did in the Ukrainian one.  
         Public opinion, European Union versus Russia 
Year EU Russia 
2014 29,50 10,00 
2013 34,00 5,50 
2012 36,00 9,00 
2011 34,50 9,00 
2010 44,00 11,50 
2009 27,00 22,00 
2008 14,00 33,00 
2002 n/a n/a 
 
 
Table 10. Public 
opinion, European 
Union versus Russa. 
Source: Authors own 
calculations based on 
different datasets. 
Original data 
originating from 
Caucasus Barometer, 
The National 
Democratic Institute, 
Gallup, Leibniz-Institut 
für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 
Europe Foundation. 
 
 As seen from Table 10, the public opinion favored towards Russia in 2008, but 
dropped slightly in 2009, after the Russo-Georgian war. The support for the EU was at its 
highest in 2010, when 44% of the public supported the EU over Russia in issues like 
integration, economic cooperation and security. The support towards Russia and towards a 
foreign policy aligning with Moscow continued to decrease from 2008 and reached its lowest 
in 2013, when only 5,5% of the public supported Russia over the EU. The public opinion 
polls seem to actually have favored Russia when the conflict escalated between Russia and 
Georgia and the shift from supporting Russia over to supporting the EU was not as dramatic 
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as it was in Ukraine. Also important, the “values of the West” were already supported more 
or less in Ukraine, since at least one third of the population supported assimilating with the 
EU and this also resulted in the support for democratic values.118 So there was not a shift in 
the public paradigm, called forth by a sudden change in the government politics that altered 
the public perception of moral values and beliefs. More so the variables of economic 
dependency and corruption did not have the possibility to alter the public opinion towards 
the EU and against Russia as it did in Ukraine. Still, when looking at statistics published by 
the International Republican Institute, Russia has been seen as either an immediate or a stand-
by threat to Georgia by the Georgian public since the beginning of 2009. There was a shift 
in favor of Russia from the end of 2012 until the beginning of 2014, when the Georgian 
public again saw Russia as the main threat for its countries security and territorial integrity.119 
Even though Russia is seen as the biggest threat for Georgia’s security and the public favors 
the European Union, the results do not fit in the context of complex interdependence, as it 
did with Ukraine. Moscow did not have any personal ties with the ruling government in 
Thblisi and could not control or alter the behavior of Georgia in 2008. The ruling regime in 
Georgia already shared the values of its people and also saw Russia as a threat to Ukraine. 
This is the reason Ukraine sought stronger cooperation with the EU, the United States (who 
solely have been seen one of the biggest security guarantors and friends in Georgia) and 
NATO. What is in common with Ukraine, is that Moscow undermined the potential MAP-s 
for both Ukraine and Georgia in 2008, when both countries were denied the MAP due to 
opposition from France and Germany. But the act itself did not change the public perception 
negatively towards Russia, it might have just done the opposite, put the West and NATO in 
the bad light by denying their accession. All in all, public opinion can be ruled out as a cause 
of the Russo-Georgian war and public opinion along with economic dependence and 
corruption is not intertwined and dependent in between the variables itself. So it also cannot 
contribute to the complex interdependent model between Russia and Georgia since the ties 
                                                 
118 Martin Müller, „Public Opinion Toward the European Union in Georgia,“ Post-Soviet Affairs, 2011, 
(27), pp. 64-92. 
119 International Republican Institute, 2015. “Public Opinion Survey. Residents of Georgia” available 
at: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf (accessed 12.05.2016). 
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between the two nations are still too low and it is not clear how one variable can affect another 
one, or if all.  
 The third variable that is needed to be analyzed is the regime type. As explained in 
the Ukrainian chapter by referring to Benoit and Gleditsch, states with ruled by a similar 
regime tend to engage less in interstate militarized disputes. Just like democracies. Russia, 
under the regime of president Putin (even when he was officially the Prime Minister) has 
been ruled by the Economist Intelligent unit as either a semi-authoritarian regime120 or as an 
authoritarian regime.121 This might suggest, that a potential interstate militarized dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine is not that plausible, but then again it still happened.  
Table 11. Democracy Index and Regime Type. Source: Economist Intelligent Unit Index of Democracy. 
 During the five day war in 2008, Russia was considered, just like Georgia, as a hybrid 
regime. So the conflict should have had less of a possibility to arise when one of the countries 
would have been an emerging democracy or an authoritarian regime. But the causes in this 
case lay elsewhere. Just like with Ukraine in 2013, Moscow felt threatened by the shift in 
Georgian official government discourse that happened after the Rose revolution. The 
revolution happened when Russia had found its new strength in the international arena and 
wanted to secure its position firstly within the former Soviet states. Near abroad policy 
reintroduced by president Putin along with Russia’s new geopolitical ambitions in the 
Caucasus region, not to mention the economic and financial alliance of CIS, that was 
supposed to become Russia’s success story of the 21st century. Georgia’s Rose revolution did 
not fit in those plans and the constant help seeking with constant seek of support from the 
                                                 
120 The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2012. „Democracy Index 2012 Democracy at a Standstil“ available 
at: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Democracy%20Index.pdf (accessed 12.05.2016). 
121 The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2014. „Democracy Index 2014 Democracy and its discontents“ 
available at: http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-
2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf (accessed 12.05.2016). 
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2008 2006 2000
Georgia 5,82 5,95 5,53 4,74 4,59 4,62 4,90 n/a
Regime Type
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime
Hybrid 
Regime n/a
Democracy Intex
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US, NATO and the EU made Russia react in a way, that they had to “retaliate” in order to 
drive the new potential allies of Georgia back. It was not so much connected with the regime 
in Georgia at the time of the war, but what the regime persuaded – democracy and security 
along with independency from Russia. This is what made Russia act through pretexts found 
in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia.  
 McMillan, in her analysis about sophisticated liberalism analyzed the change in 
societies through Keohane. McMillan concludes that when one member of a dyad wants to 
pursue its liberal economic goals and interests, it requires the extension of a certain political 
order “and this can produce conflict between states. Likewise, if the political order is 
threatened, force may be required to defend it.”122 This is what happened in Georgia 2008 
and in Ukraine 2013. Russia felt threatened by the new liberal goals of both states that 
required the extension of the new political order, thus moving away from Moscow’s sphere 
of influence. This made Russia feel threatened and in order to secure its position, force had 
to be used. So complex interdependence might or might not have existed, it could not 
overcome the threat for security. 
 The question, whether there was not only an act of aggression from the Russian side, 
but if there was a war in the context of international law is easier to answer than it was with 
the Ukrainian case. President Saakashvili declared war over the territories of South-Ossetia 
in August 2008: “I have signed a decree on a state of war. Georgia is in a state of total military 
aggression,"123 Considering the statements made by president Putin, who declared that: “War 
has started,”124 and the scale of the interstate militarized dispute, i.e. the forces used and the 
casualties carried, there is little or no doubt that the two countries were at war in 2008.  
                                                 
122 Susan M. McMillan, „Interdependence and Conflict,“ Mershon International Studies Review, 1997, 
(41), pp. 33-58. 
123 The Guardian, 2008. “Georgia declares 'state of war' over South Ossetia“ available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/09/georgia.russia2 (accessed 15.05.2016).  
124 Adrian Blomfield, The Telegraph, 2008. „Georgia: Russia enters into 'war' in South Ossetia“ 
available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2525400/Georgia-Russia-enters-
into-war-in-South-Ossetia.html (accessed 16.05.2016). 
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Belarus 
In order to fully understand the relationship of complex interdependence and how 
economic interdependence can potentially decrease the likelihood of interstate militarized 
disputes or not, and on what conditions. It is necessary to look at a third country as a 
comparison with Ukraine and Georgia in order to compare the complex interdependence 
model and to determine regarding the control variables used in this research, on what 
conditions complex interdependence will prevail or fail.  
Regarding economic dependence, Belarus’s economy has been the most dependent 
on Russia’s economy. The dependence was at its highest in 2000, peaking at almost 30%, 
but the dependency has steadily declined ever since and was at 16,54% in 2014.  
Table 12. Dependence as % of GDP (Foreign trade + Inward FDI). Georgia. Source: Authors own calculations. 
Formula by Russet, O’Neal, Davis, 1998. Original data originating from the World Bank, Russian Federal 
Federation Federal State Statistics Service, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, United Nations Database. 
Belarus’s GDP in 2014 was 76,14 mln US dollars, 16,54% equals 12,59 mln US 
dollars originating directly from Russia via FDI-s and through foreign trade with Russia. In 
2014. Also, as was the case with Ukraine, Belarus is also highly dependent on Russian natural 
gas and gas disputes between the two countries have occurred on several occasions since the 
early 2000s. Not only was and is Belarus itself highly dependent on Russian gas, but around 
20-25% of natural gas is passing Belarus and is being exported to the rest of Europe. Belarus 
energy carrier disparity has basically not changed over the last decades, if not, Belarus has 
become even more dependent on Russian natural gas than before, although Belarus is trying 
to decrease its energy carrier dependence from Russia by decreasing the natural gas import 
from 90% to 70% in 2035. More so, the official government plan also foresees the reduction 
of natural gas in electricity and heat production from 90% to 50% in 2035.125 As hinted, over 
                                                 
125 Vadzim Smok, Belarus Digest, 2016. „Belarus Struggles To Reduce Energy Dependence On 
Russia,“ available at: http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-struggles-reduce-energy-dependence-russia-24413 
(accessed 16.05.2016). 
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2005 2000
Belarus 16,54 20,55 22,71 29,43 20,04 16,78 20,03 29,96
Dependence, as a % of GDP (Foreign Trade + Inward FDI)
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90% of natural gas and oil is being imported from Russia and when looking at energy 
production from energy carriers, the dependency ration from Russia increases even more. In 
2011, 98,28% of electricity produced in Belarus, was from natural gas and 88,57% of heat 
was produced from natural gas. The energy and heat produced is being used by mostly the 
industrial and residential sectors in Belarus. Combined the two sectors use 65,64% of 
electricity produced and 77,12% of heat produced.126  
The economic and energy dependence in Belarus is, just like it was in Ukraine, deeply 
intertwined with corruption in the political and business sector. The UN Innovation 
Performance Review on Belarus states: “The influence of the government over the economy 
remains extensive, including not only direct ownership of enterprises but also administrative 
intervention in credit allocation and widespread subsidies.”127 The triadic nexus of business, 
politics and corruption between the concerned parties, as it was described in Ukraine, is also 
present in the case of Minsk and Moscow. Not only are Belarusian private and state owned 
enterprises dependent on the Russian market, the personal formal and informal ties are also 
extensive. The ruling regime in Minks has been over the past decades on good terms with the 
ruling regime in Moscow. Moscow has seen Minks and president Lukashenko not only an 
international ally, but also a personal one. Yet on the other hand, the energy disputes initiated 
from the Russian side (either by Gazprom on directly by Moscow) in 2004, 2007, 2010 and 
2013 have shown that Minsk cannot always be controlled as easily as Moscow would hope. 
As Peter Rutland describes: “Using energy as a carrot rather than a stick has not proved any 
more effective. Ten years of subsidised energy prices for Belarus did not produce a loyal and 
subservient ally. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka grew increasingly hostile 
towards Putin.”128 Lukashenka went even as far as calling the pause in gas supplies from 
Russia to Belarus an act of terrorism. The reason behind this are the numbers of energy and 
                                                 
126 Olga Meerovskaya, Yauhen Hurynau, Anatoly Hryshanovich, Alla Minko, Belarusian Institute of 
System Analysis and Information Support of Scientific and Technical Sphere, 2014. “Belarus ENERGY Sector: 
The Potential for Renewable Energy Sources and Energy Efficiency” available at:  
https://ener2i.eu/page/34/attach/0_Belarus_Country_Report.pdf (accessed at 15.05.2016). 
127 United Nations, 2011. „Innovation Performance Review of Belarus“ available at: 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/publications/icp4.pdf (accessed 15.05.2016).  
128 Peter Rutland, „Russia as an Energy Superpower,“ New Political Economy, 2008, (13), pp. 203-
210.  
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heat consumption. Just like in Ukraine, the Belarus government would lose a lot of its 
political credibility it needs very much to stay in power, when a major stop in energy supplies 
would occur. So Lukashenka needs leverage from its own internal sphere of political 
supporters, he also needs the support from public and at the same time he needs to hold 
favorable relations with Moscow, purportraying himself as a strong leader in relations with 
Russia. Moscow eventually succeeded in acquiring 50% of the Belorussian gas line and the 
infrastructure now is shared by Gazprom and the local Beltransgaz. Russia also owns several 
large oil refineries in Belarus and is supposedly looking to take over the oil sectors 
infrastructure in Belarus. The intertwined political and business sphere in Belarus and in the 
dyadic relationship between Belarus and Russia also can be seen in the CPI of Transparency 
International. 
Table 13. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Source: Transparency International, 
Corruption Perception Index Database. 
 Table 13 supports the arguments about corruption and the ties between Belarus and 
Russia. This indicates that the complex interdependence model at least so far can be fitted to 
the relationship of Belarus and Russia and considering the amount of dependency in different 
sectors combined with corruption.  
         Public opinion, European Union versus Russia 
Year EU Russia 
2013 40,00 40,00 
2012 47,00 35,00 
2011 41,00 38,00 
2010 34,85 27,00 
2009 38,70 42,20 
2008 30,00 46,00 
2007 33,30 47,50 
2006 29,30 56,50 
2005 24,80 51,60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Public 
opinion, European 
Union versus Russa. 
Source: Authors own 
calculations. Original 
data originating from 
Independent Institute of 
Socio-Economic and 
Political Studies. 
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2005 2000
Belarus 31,00 29,00 31,00 2,40 2,50 2,40 2,60 4,10
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
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2004 37,60 47,70 
2003 36,10 47,60 
 
 
 As seen from the public opinion polls about favoring the EU or Russia, the stand 
between the two neighbors for Belarus has been pretty evenly matched. Vadzim Smok has 
analyzed the Belorussian national identity between the democratic West and the 
authoritarian, post-Soviet East. He argues that president Lukashenko has been able to build 
a weak national Belorussian identity that in some levels unites the nation. “The Belarusian 
state (or political regime, which is one in same in this case) retains a strong hold over society 
and has deeply affected the self-consciousness of its citizens over nearly two decades of 
Lukashenka’s rule. It has brought much of the Soviet legacy back and rejected an ethno-
national identity as a path for state building.”129 But the identity itself, just like the state of 
Belorussia is dependent on Russia. Russia is keeping Belarus within its sphere of influence 
by feeding Belarus cheap natural resources (compared with the prices eligible for the rest of 
Europe) and favorable trading deals and until this is favored, the Russia oriented-identity will 
prevail in Belarus. Smok argues that if there would be a long-term dispute in the Russian-
Belarus dyad, the public opinion that at the moment is more based on territory and state, 
rather than language and culture, will change rather sooner than later. This, as Smok implies, 
will also bring along inevitable changes in the governing regime itself. He continues: “There 
is still another problem that can yet emerge, particularly considering the attitude of the 
political and economic elite towards the issue of identity. The current Belarusian elite has no 
sense of national pride or concern for anything to save their own material wellbeing. Whether 
they will alter their behaviour and involve alternative identity politics when the regime 
changes is still unclear.”130 Interestingly, when looking at public opinion polls about re-
establishing and joining the USSR, the latter concept is viewed negatively. More so, up to 
half of the population is in contact with the Western, European values and the EU is favored 
in the society. A Ukraine like pattern might emerge in Belarus as well. This is due to the lack 
                                                 
129 Vadzim Smok, 2013. Ostrogorski Centre “Belarusian Identity: the Impact of Lukashenka’s 
Regime” available at: http://belarusdigest.com/papers/belarusianidentity.pdf (accessed 17.05.2016). 
130 Ibid.  
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of a national identity in Belarus, severe changes within the society can create a new national 
identity discourse that might overshadow the potential political and economic gains from 
Moscow. Also there is the question of younger generation. The younger generation does not 
share the old pro-Russian and pre-independence values. The new generation is exchanging 
its values and ideas in the social media where the official propaganda is not seen so much. 
Also unlike Russia, Belarus has not forbid independent media enterprises and third party 
operated media sites (blogs, political comments etc.). The younger generation shares more 
democratic values and is less connected with the European values than it is with the Russian-
orthodox ones. A political “coup” that was the outcome of Euromaidan – a spontaneously 
organized demonstration, where information was exchanged via. social media was formed 
originally by the younger generation, who were disappointed with the government decision 
to favor Russia over the EU. Such events are plausible in Belarus as well and it is the author’s 
opinion, that sooner or later the younger generation will take power in Ukraine.  
 The case of regime type in Belarus is also noteworthy. Belarus, as Russia, has been 
an authoritarian regime, thus it could be implied, that since the two regimes are closely linked 
to each other and the regime type is the same, it would rather foster security in the dyad, 
rather than evoke it. 
Table 15. Democracy Index and Regime Type. Source: Economist Intelligent Unit Index of Democracy. 
Sharing the same regime type and the same governmental policies ties the two states together 
even more. Just like in Russia, the political regime can be described in Belarus as a 
hierarchical pyramid. The president and his closest allies are at the top and are supposedly 
untouchable from the judicial system. Corruption levels are also the highest at the top. This 
secures the regime its power, but makes it in turn dependent on corruption. A scheme that 
was also present in Ukraine.  
Country 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2008 2006 2000
Belarus 3,69 3,04 3,04 3,16 3,34 3,34 3,34 n/a
Regime Type
Authorita
rian
Authorita
rian
Authorita
rian
Authorita
rian
Authorita
rian
Authorita
rian
Authorita
rian n/a
Democracy Intex
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 All in all the complex interdependence model is functioning in the Russia-Belarus 
dyad. It supports the liberal theory, that interdependence increases the likelihood of war and 
decreases the likelihood of a militarized interstate conflict. Russia has also managed to make 
Belarus dependent on its economy and energy, thus also implying that the realist asymmetric 
dependency model, i.e. the Hirschmann-Kirshner model works favorably for Russia. At least 
for now. The key issue again, just like it was in Ukraine, seems to be the public opinion. At 
the moment, president Lukashenka and its regime are enjoying a very high support rate – in 
the presidential elections back in October, 2015, Lukashenko received 83,5% of the total 
votes and continues to be the president for the fifth term.131 But the Ukrainian events that 
started in 2013 have shown that the public opinion and the national identity values can change 
very quickly and have severe consequences for the ruling regime.  
  
                                                 
131 The Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican 
Referenda, 2015, “Results of the elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus (2015)” available at: 
http://www.rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-PRB2015-result_en.pdf (accessed 17.05.2016). 
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Conclusion 
The objective of this research was to determine whether complex interdependence 
can increase peace and decrease the potential of war among its members. The study focused 
on Russia-Ukraine, Russia-Georgia and eight CIS members in a dyadic relationship with 
Russia. The third dyad analyzed was Russia-Belarus, since economic dependence was very 
strong and this hinted the existence of complex interdependence between the dyadic 
members. 
After considering the analysis about the three cases, in some sense it might seem that 
Russia is applying the Hirschmann-Kirshner model on its dyad members – by giving its 
partners economic discounts (through trade, FDI-s and energy) it is making the partners 
within a dyad dependent on himself. On the other hand Russia is known to cut the export of 
gas into its strategic partner countries and force the partners to pay a much higher price if 
they do not obey on some Russia set preconditions. Such a behavior does not fit into the 
Hirschmann-Kirshner model. 
Armenia-Russia dyad was analyzed, since economic dependence statistically was not 
significant in the years before 2014, but Armenia was, and is, highly energy dependent from 
Russia. Also, the Armenian business and political elites are intertwined with Moscow’s elites 
and are somewhat dependent on Russian money and tenders. The leverage Moscow has over 
Armenia could be described as the Hirschmann-Kirshner model, since when Armenia wanted 
to diversify its energy import in order to decrease its dependence from Russia, Russia cut the 
subsidiaries and forced Armenia to change its economic and foreign policy directions. It 
seems that Russia does not have that many economic handles to control Armenia (though 
relevant and trustworthy statistics for 2015 and Q1 2016 is not available), it can control and 
alter its economic and foreign policy course through energy dependence. Selling cheap 
natural gas will keep Yerevan closely linked to Moscow, but recent news might suggest a 
change again, Russia’s actions will probably escalate in a gas dispute between the two 
nations.  
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The second dyad analyzed was Russia-Ukraine. The findings implied for a strong 
case of complex interdependence between Russia and Ukraine, originating from strong 
economic dependence and continuing into energy dependency, corruption and from there on 
into political interdependence and eventually into the public opinion. Public opinion in 
Ukraine was the key variable in this research. It showed how Ukraine was split into two 
different societies: pro-Western and pro-Russian. The Euromaidan started out as a rather 
small protest of the younger generation who rejected the governing regime policies and 
wanted Ukraine to turn to the West. They represented and shared the Western values and 
eventually the Euromaidan helped to create a new Ukrainian identity that united both young 
and old and both Ukrainian and Russian speaking parts of the society. Such a change in values 
was eventually seen as a security threat by Russia which escalated into an ongoing war 
between Ukraine and Russia. Research showed that newly found and created national 
identities, shared values and beliefs and dissatisfaction with high levels of corruption and a 
poorly governed state can be the variables that can potentially set a nation into a revolution. 
Although complex interdependence was present and existed in the dyad, it could not stop 
changes originating from inside the society. The newly found unifying identity of Ukrainians 
did not care about the potential losses when breaking a costly economic dependent 
relationship since in the Ukrainian case, values and identities overshadowed the potential 
gains and losses of complex interdependence. A statement that was also assured with the 
Schwarz Value Theory as well. Russia did had leverage over Ukraine and saw Ukraine as a 
security buffer and also as a mean to influence the EU. A change in that made Moscow react, 
the fear of losing some if its security in the region and the fear of losing its influence over 
the region. It is not the ‘fault’ of complex interdependence, since an internal revolution does 
not really care about external relations of its government.  
Russia did not have the same amount of leverage within its dyadic relationship with 
Georgia (if any at all) to influence Georgia internally by using economic means, in order to 
keep the country in its own sphere of influence. Although Georgia was CIS country, after the 
Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia had turned its back on Russia and wanted to cooperate 
both with the EU and NATO. Georgia’s foreign policy was directed towards the cooperation 
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EU and Washington (NATO) in order for Georgia’s ultimate goal to gain access at least one 
of the unions, but preferably both. Russia’s new ruling regime under president Putin and 
Russia’s attempts to revive the sphere of influence over the former Soviet states so they could 
be controlled economically and politically were diametrically different from the course of 
actions Georgia, under the new president Mikheil Saakashvili had chosen. Since the 
economic ties with Russia were basically nonexistent and Georgia making new deals with its 
neighbors for acquiring natural gas, Russia could only see Georgia slipping away. When 
aligning its foreign policy with the European Union might even have been acceptable for 
Moscow, the pursuits to gain a full membership status in NATO was seen as a major threat 
from Moscow’s side. At the same time Ukraine as well was seeking a MAP from NATO and 
pushed to increase cooperation between Ukraine and Washington. The two countries, one on 
the Western border and the second one in the South being both a member of NATO was a 
possibility Russia had to stop. The NATO enlargement of 2004 was seen already as a security 
threat from Moscow and an even further enlargement and coming more closer towards 
Russian borders had to be undermined. Except for the presence of complex interdependence, 
the reason for war is somewhat the same as it was with the case of Ukraine. Moscow, after 
reinventing its foreign policy doctrines and trying to raise its influence in its neighboring 
countries through economic levers like CIS and energy supply, Moscow also wanted to 
secure its positions security wise and Georgia turning more and more towards the west, 
seeing its main security partners the United States and NATO were the factors that made in 
this case Moscow react. Complex interdependence is the Russia-Georgia dyad was present, 
but it could not have hindered the war between the two states, since the later scenario of 
Ukraine would have prevailed in Georgia as well. Again it is safe to state that 
interdependence could not have avoided something it did not control –an emerging (super) 
power who once again was seeking recognition and influence and wanted to show the US 
and NATO it can do basically whatever it wants in its own backyard. Even the membership 
of CSTO could not stop the states of entering a state of war. 
In the dyad of Russia and Belarus, complex interdependence exists just like it did 
within the Russia-Ukraine dyad. A lot is same when comparing the two dyads. Belarus, as 
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was Ukraine, is seen the last authoritarian ally for Russia in the West. The governing regime 
is same, the hierarchical system is the same. Belarus is heavily dependent on Russian 
economy and even more so, on Russian energy carriers. Just like in Ukraine before the events 
of Euromaidan, there is a lack of unifying national identity and values and the society is 
somewhat split into half, a pro-Western and pro-Russian side. As was already implied in the 
last chapter, the Ukrainian events are possible in Belarus as well when there is a sudden shift 
of values and beliefs in society that will unify the nation. As seen on Ukraine, history will 
probably repeat itself in the case of Belarus. Since the patterns is the same – economic and 
energy dependence, high level of corruption, similar regimes, complex interdependence 
prevails and just like Russia and Georgia were both members of the CSTO, are Belarus and 
Russia members of the CSTO. But a fundamental shift towards the EU and the West in 
general would make Russia act once more. Belarus seems to be Russia’s last stand between 
itself and the West. Russia cannot allow to lose its position.  
It seems that complex interdependence can be divided into two main categories. 
Complex interdependence between democracies and complex interdependence between 
semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes in dyad where one part is economically and 
politically significantly stronger. In the first case, research has shown that interdependence 
indeed decreases the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. But on the second case, the 
stronger partner in a dyad might seem threatened by internal changes within the smaller state. 
Those internal changes (changes in national and moral values, national identities, 
dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, a desire for a change) are the results of bad governing 
and bad complex interdependence, favoring the corrupt on the top of the hierarchy and 
damaging the lower classes in the society. A very broad statement, but looking at the conflicts 
between Ukraine-Russia and Georgia-Russia and the internal tendencies within Belarus and 
Armenia, it might have some truth behind it. Future changes could be foreseen by looking at 
the levels and nature of complex interdependence between the dyad members and the internal 
changes within the societies. All in all, future research is needed in order to fully unravel the 
topic in hand.  
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Appendix 1. 
Sources for statistics: 
- http://arka.am/en/news/economy/armenia_imported_2_451_billion_cubic_meters_o
f_natural_gas_from_russia_and_iran_in_2014/ 
- http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2010ge/codebook/ 
- http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2011ge/codebook/ 
- http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2012ge/codebook/ 
- http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/UA?display=def
ault 
- http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
- http://documents.mx/documents/gazprom-in-figures-2006-2010-factbook.html 
- http://erranet.org/ 
- http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx 
- http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/de_de/PDFs/brochures/BP-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf 
- http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/?PrtId=svs 
- http://www.epfound.ge/files/eu_attitudes_survey_eng_nov_24_1.pdf 
- http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/02/02/ukraine-boasts-european-gas-
imports-but-most-of-it-still-russian/#649a42430f63 
- http://www.gallup.com/poll/122258/georgians-attitudes-toward-russia-less-friendly-
war.aspx 
- http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/07/271326/gazprom-in-figures-2009-2013-en.pdf 
- http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/14/618809/presentation-press-conference-2015-
06-09-en.pdf 
- http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=137&lang=eng 
- http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d02/26-05.htm 
- http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d02/27-05.htm 
- http://www.iiseps.org/?page_id=1349&lang=en 
- http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=am&v=139 
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- http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pd 
- https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=6288&search=georgia&search2=&d
b=e&tab=0&notabs=&nf=1&af=&ll=10 
- https://knoema.com/EIAIES2014/international-energy-statistics-
2014?tsId=1140950 
- https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf 
- https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Georgia_August-2014-survey_Public-
Issues_ENG_vf.pdf 
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